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ABSTRACT
A Dynamic Theory of Party Discipline, Legislator Roll-Call Voting & Electoral
Accountability in the U.S. House
by
Charles Doriean
Chair: Kenneth W. Kollman
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain observed rates of party unity on
roll-call voting in the U.S. House, by determining the conditions under which Rep-
resentatives cross-pressured between party and constituency choose to side with the
latter. To help answer this question, I develop a dynamic model of party discipline,
legislator vote choice and electoral feedback, and analyze it to develop insights about
how partisan context and electoral threat condition the behavior of marginal legisla-
tors. I then test the model’s predictions, both at the level of the party caucus and
at the level of individual legislators. I find strong support for the idea that parti-
san context conditions the possible dispersion of party unity rates across a legislative
caucus, but only mixed support for predictions regarding factors that may affect the
responsiveness of individual legislator vote behavior to their own electoral security.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Few phenomena in American politics have attracted as much interest from aca-
demic sources (Fiorina et al 2011; McCarty et al 2006) and the popular press (Brown-
stein 2007) than that of partisan polarization. Nowhere has this interest been more
clear than in studies of legislator behavior in the U.S. House, with academic writers
focusing on sources of this development located both inside and outside the chamber
(see Rae [2007] for a review of the extensive literature on the topic). This separation
in party behavior is especially evident when assessing the willingness of members to
support the party line on key votes (e.g. those votes that pit majorities from each
party against each other). That is, members can be increasingly relied upon to “fall
in line” on the controversial votes that separate the parties.
Although party polarization is remarkable as a recent stylized fact in American
politics, the longer history of American partisan competition shows that polariza-
tion has waxed and waned as outside political pressures and institutions of partisan
legislative organization have changed (Gerring 2001, Han and Brady 2007, Jenkins
et al 2004). There are both structural1 and institutional factors contributing to the
1By structural factors, I am referring broadly to social or economic conditions and patterns of
interaction that shape an individual’s political incentives.
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recent intensification of partisan polarization, and untangling them can be a difficult
proposition. Still, the question can be usefully posed in the following way: to what
extent does the electoral safety of legislators across a party’s caucus contribute to the
willingness of legislators to support the party line on conflictual roll-call votes, and
thus to legislative polarization?
This question leads to a (nearly) equivalent question: when will legislators who
are cross-pressured between party and constituency choose to side with the former,
and when will they side with the latter? Answering this question requires a theory of
how legislators respond to the signals that constituents give them – the most powerful
of these being shifts in their margin of re-election. Reduced margins of re-election
may reflect constituency displeasure with a legislator’s voting record, and can compel
a legislator to adjust her behavior accordingly, by reducing her willingness to support
the party on visible roll-call votes (this could also be put the other way, in that
legislators could be understood to feel freer to support their party on potentially
controversial votes when their future electoral fortunes appear to be more secure,
based on current returns).
The nature and strength of this adjustment relationship, though, is mediated
through key partisan institutions in the legislature, which are designed (in part)
precisely to help the party garner sufficient support on controversial roll-call votes to
see their preferences put into action (or to obstruct the other party from seeing theirs
put into action). The character of the party discipline regime encountered by an in-
dividual legislator is therefore critical to understanding how electoral accountability
might function for members of the U.S. House.
1.2 The Project
This dissertation begins with the premise that, in the context of the U.S. House
of Representatives, electoral pressures manifest themselves within the context of the
2
two party system, and that a representative’s degree of association with the party
in legislative behavior serves as a crucial signal and marker for the translation of
constituency preference into policy. This raises the possibility that the strength of a
representative’s observed party loyalty, and the resulting electoral change in response
to such loyalty, may serve as a key conduit of electoral accountability in the American
political system. However, since legislative parties organize their electoral and policy
activities (at least in part) in order to help facilitate the re-election of their elected
officials, it makes sense that parties may try to ameliorate any future electoral conse-
quences that their members may experience for choosing to side with their party over
their constituency on a particular issue or roll-call vote, thereby limiting the potential
of this channel of electoral accountability.
In addition, since the nature of partisan legislative organization itself is also partly
determined by electoral considerations, it’s not immediately obvious how the legisla-
tive party might mediate the relationship between a constituency and its elected
representative. For this reason, it is necessary to develop a model of partisan organi-
zation, legislative behavior and electoral accountability in which legislator adaptation
to constituency feedback and party demands on their member legislators are jointly
determined, based on the same external circumstances. The approach to the modeling
of legislator decision-making that follows from this assumption is novel, in that it is
explicitly dynamic – legislators adjust their behavior retrospectively, based on con-
stituency feedback, in a way that is mediated by partisan institutions that organize
legislative action within the House.
In this dissertation project, I develop such a model of party decision-making, legis-
lator roll-call behavior and electoral accountability. I use this model to determine the
conditions under which moderate legislators, cross-pressured between party and con-
stituency, will defect from the party line so as to better ensure their electoral survival.
The key insight from the model is that while sufficiently strong cross-pressure will
3
induce defections from cross-pressured legislators, extremely strong pressure causes
moderates to lose, regardless of their behavior. This finding focuses attention on
the importance of the electoral survival of moderates to the generation of observed
distributions of party unity rates in the U.S. House, and also on the key role that
legislator tenure plays in attenuating electoral accountability.
I investigate the role that partisan context, especially preference heterogeneity
within a party caucus, plays in generating observed distributions of party unity in
the U.S. House. I find supporting evidence for the mediating role that partisan con-
text plays in the connection between electoral security and party loyalty. I further
investigate the relationship between electoral security and party loyalty at the indi-
vidual level, focusing on the conditioning effect that intensity of cross-pressure and
legislator tenure have on this connection. Again, I find support for conditioning ef-
fects of tenure and cross-pressure on the connection between electoral security and
party loyalty. Similar results are found for conditioning effects of cross-pressure for
the connection between a representative’s party loyalty and the probability of a rep-
resentative successfully securing re-election in the future.
1.3 Plan for the Dissertation
The body of the dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, I provide a critical review of the scholarly literature on party po-
larization in American politics, partisan organization of the U.S. House, and the
connection between legislator partisanship and electoral accountability. I show how
insights from this literature help to motivate an explicit model of party organization,
legislative behavior and electoral accountability in the U.S. House.
In Chapter 3, I motivate, conceptualize and formalize a dynamic model of party
decision-making, legislator vote choice and electoral feedback. I begin by discussing
the key features such a model should have. Next, I consider the key outcomes and
4
quantities of interest. Finally, I propose a formal, mathematical version of the model,
beginning with initial conditions, and proceeding to describe the constituent submod-
els for party leaders, legislators and voters.
In Chapter 4, I propose a strategy for model analysis and discuss how the structure
of the model affects the approach used for collection and classification of model output.
I then analyze results from model simulation runs, and draw inferences from them
to motivate testable hypotheses about the connection between electoral security and
party loyalty among members of the U.S. House. I find that the development of
clusters of low-loyalty moderates, which drives observed dispersion in party unity
rates across a party caucus, is most likely to occur when levels of cross-pressure are
moderate – that is, high enough for moderates to want to defect, but low enough for
moderates to survive, and develop their own ideological reputations. Thus, analysis
of the connection between electoral security and party loyalty for legislators must
consider both the partisan context in which legislators make decisions, and the factors
that facilitate the electoral survival of cross-pressured legislators.
In Chapter 5, I characterize party-level (or “macro-level”) distributions of party
loyalty in the U.S. House, as a function of the broad electoral circumstances faced by
the congressional party. First, some basic features of the distribution of party loyalty
scores are considered, with special attention paid to the natural heteroskedasticity
found in the relationship between electoral security and party loyalty. Next, I propose
a framework for fitting vectors of observed party loyalty scores to the Beta distribu-
tion, in a way that permits the systematic study of moderate party defection as a
coping structure for party-constituency cross-pressure. Finally, I test hypotheses gen-
erated by the model with respect to the values of fitted Beta parameters, especially
the dispersion parameter, φ, as a function of electoral conditions and institutional
change, finding mixed evidence for the hypotheses under consideration.
In Chapter 6, I take a closer look at individual legislators, investigating the connec-
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tions between re-election margin and party unity rates, and between party unity rates
and subsequent re-election probabilities, for U.S. House members. In particular, this
analysis focuses on the conditioning effects that cross-pressure and legislator tenure
have on each of these connections, and their implications for electoral accountability.
Again, I find mixed evidence for the hypotheses under consideration.
In Chapter 7, I summarize my findings, and consider possible new directions for
the research agenda built upon a dynamic perspective on electoral accountability.
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CHAPTER II
Party Loyalty & Electoral Accountability in the
U.S. House: Toward a Dynamic Theory
A great deal of scholarship exists on the subjects on party polarization, legisla-
tive organization, and electoral accountability in the U.S. House. The purpose of
this chapter to review the existing literature on these subjects, with an eye toward
motivating a dynamic model of party discipline, legislator behavior and electoral ac-
countability in the U.S. House.
First, I consider the electoral roots of observed partisanship in the House, paying
special attention to the ways in which parties serve to structure electoral competition.
Then, I discuss how electoral responsiveness and accountability may be channeled
through elite partisanship, with constituents holding representatives accountable to
votes with their party that may run counter to constituent interests by revoking elec-
toral security, and how representatives may respond to increased electoral insecurity
by distancing themselves from their party. Next, I describe how the partisan legisla-
tive organization of the House serves the interests of party members, and how this
phenomenon can potentially mediate the accountability relationship described above.
Finally, I propose a dynamic model of partisan legislative organization, legislator vote
behavior and electoral feedback, that can generate conditions under which moderates
cross-pressured between party and constituency will respond to electoral threat by
7
defecting from the party line on roll-call votes.
2.1 The Electoral Roots of Legislative Partisanship
Parties are widely understood to be central to the operation of American democ-
racy (Schattschneider 1942), owing largely to the advantages associated with elec-
tioneering and legislating that come with party affiliation by ambitious office-seekers
(Aldrich 2011). Because of this, political conflict is often expressed as partisan con-
flict, and policy positions are understood to involve greater or lesser association with
the two major political parties. As evidence from the study of recent electoral polar-
ization demonstrates, there are at least three ways in which parties help to structure
political conflict in the electoral arena. First, parties may merely reflect changes in the
structure and distribution of political preferences in the electorate. Second, parties
may exert some control over how newly salient political issues are associated with (or
diverge from) existing conflicts – a phenomenon variously studied as “ conflict exten-
sion” or “issue evolution.” Finally, parties provide important cues as to how partisan
identifiers with undeveloped preferences on an issue, or preferences that conflict with
those of their party, should form or adjust their preferences. In this section, I consider
each of these factors in turn.
2.1.1 Structural Preference Divergence
The simplest explanation for why parties may be salient for political conflict is that
they create and promote policy platforms that reflect concrete and enduring conflicts
of interest in the electorate, and sensible combinations of issue positions. Variation
in the strength of this relationship should then be tied to actual structural changes
in the distribution of preferences and interests of the electorate. Put simply, the
recent, apparent polarization in the behavior of elected representatives could simply
reflect actual divergence in the interests and preferences of voters (Paulson 2007).
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For instance, McCarty et al (2006) attribute variation in observed rates of political
polarization in roll-call votes in the U.S. House and Senate to changing patterns of
income inequality in the United States over time. Additionally, as Gerring (2001) and
Brewer and Stonecash (2009) point out, sectional conflicts, urban/rural divides and
conflicts between religious denominations have also structured partisan rifts from one
era to the next, and determined how they change.
Additionally, since the US employs single-member district election systems for all
of its federal offices,1 the distribution of political preferences across constituencies can
affect how parties translate preferences into policy platforms, as well. Explanations
of the recent trend in electoral polarization have also related greater dissimilarity
in the platforms of Republicans and Democrats to changes in how preferences and
interests are distributed geographically, owing mainly to migration (Bishop 2009).
An archetypal example of this is the ideological and partisan transformation of the
Southern United States in the late 20th century, which owes a great deal to economic
development and suburban growth (Shafer and Johnston 2006, Lassiter 2013, Kousser
2010). The development took a remarkably different (and more ideologically conser-
vative) cast from the patterns of development seen previously in the North (Mellow
2008), and stimulated interstate migration by transforming the South into a place
that was widely perceived to be more amenable to affordable family formation that
the Northern metropolitan areas that migrants left behind (Hawley 2013).
2.1.2 Issue Cleavages & Partisan Alignments
The second way in which parties help to structure political conflict is by deter-
mining the ways in which issue cleavages are translated into party cleavages – this
process emphasizes the role that elites such as party leaders, elected officials and ac-
tivists play in expressing conflicts of interest through cleavages in the party system.
1With a few historical exceptions.
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Elites can do this by bundling new political issues with their existing platforms, a
process known as conflict extension (Schattschneider 1964). They can also do this
by making a concerted attempt to assemble new elite coalitions in which issues that
previously cross-cut against party divisions are made part of the major party divide, a
process known as “issue evolution” (Carmines and Stimson 1989, Schofield and Miller
2007).
The relative important of conflict extension and issue evolution2 varies across time
and political context.3 What each perspective shares is a focus on the way in which
elites’ political motivations determine how issues are translated into partisan conflict.
Since voters are generally thought to lack the kind of ideological consistency (Converse
1964) that might constrain the way in which they systematically link issues in their
minds, elites enjoy a substantial amount of leeway to suggest and promote potential
alignments or dis-alignments between positions on distinct issue dimensions.
Subsequent to changes in elite position-taking, voters react by shifting their party
affiliations based on the new partisan issue divides implied by the new platforms. A
good example of this phenomenon lies in how racial issues were brought into line with
the economic divides separating the Democratic and Republican parties in the mid-to-
late 20th century (Carmines and Stimson 1989). In that case, Democrats took more
uniformly liberal positions and Republicans took more uniformly conservative posi-
tions. Voters responded in a rational way to this development, by switching parties
when their ideologies came into conflict with that of their original party (Stonecash
2003, Stonecash 2006, Reiter and Stonecash 2011). The net effect of this combination
of issue dimensions in a partisan divide is to increase the total distance between their
views (Brewer 2005, Layman et al 2005).
2Which is very similar to Schattschneider’s (1964) concept of “conflict displacement”, and can
be understood as a theoretical grounding for work on party realignments (e.g. Sundquist 1983).
3For instance, see Layman and Carsey (2002) for a discussion on how recent evolution in the
policy positions of Democrats and Republicans represents a conflict extension approach, rather than
an issue evolution approach.
10
2.1.3 Partisan Cues & Sorting
Both the literature on structural polarization and the literature on elite issue ma-
nipulation share the presumption that voters have well-defined preferences. However,
much of the literature on political behavior in the American context focuses on how
parties actually affect the way that voters reason about political issues, including de-
termining what issue positions to hold and what candidates or proposals to support.
While many of these explanations can be understood to be cognitive (e.g. the percep-
tual screen as in Campbell et al [1960], or motivated reasoning models like Taber and
Lodge [2006] or Druckman et al [2013]) or affective (see the social identity approach
of Green et al [2002]), there also exists substantial evidence that parties also have an
informational effect on voters’ political evaluations, serving as cue-givers.
Since voters have a fairly good idea of what the parties generally stand for (Brewer
2010, Baumer and Gold 2010), it stands to reason that they can infer valuable in-
formation about the desirability of policy positions and/or candidate issue platforms
based on their association with partisan labels. Bayesian approaches to party iden-
tification (Achen 1992, Gerber and Green 1998) and preference change (Gerber and
Jackson 1993) operationalize this idea in the most formal and strict way, but more
generally, informational theories of party influence have driven a major portion of
scholarly work on the effect of parties on voter opinion and behavior. This has come
mainly through the discussion of partisan labels and symbols as cues that guide an
individual toward political conclusions consonant with their prior understanding of
their attachments, identity and interests (Zaller 1992, Rahn 1993).
In the context of modern American politics, the study of cues has focused on
the phenomenon of polarization among party elites, and how this may affect the
preferences and behavior of voters. In particular, there has been a substantial focus
on how elite polarization strengthens the informativeness of partisan cues, even in the
absence of underlying preference change on the part of voters. The ideological sorting
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that took place in the mid-to-late 20th century, as conservative Southern Democrats
shifted to the Republican party, and as liberal Northern Republicans moved to the
Democrats (Reiter and Stonecash 2011) caused party labels to take on more clear and
consistent values. This, in turn, caused voters to be more likely choose the “right”
party for their ideology in a consistent fashion (Hetherington 2009, Levendusky 2010,
Levendusky and Pope 2011).
2.2 Party Loyalty & Electoral Accountability: Staying In-
Step with Constituents
By reflecting, structuring and sending cues about political conflicts, parties play
a crucial role in determining the nature and shape of electoral competition. Since
the general trend in recent decades has been towards increased polarization of issue
positions between the two parties, the relevant scholarship in each case has been
primarily oriented toward explaining why voters and/or elites may have increasingly
divergent positions or interests. However, the more general point that can be inferred
from the above discussion is that there is a connection between polarization at the
level of elite behavior and the underlying preference structure of the masses – even if
this connection is strongly mediated by elite interests and strategy.
Put differently, it is likely inevitable that electoral conflict in American politics
is structured by parties that stake out diverging platforms on the issues. These
party positions, through their roles in informing the electorate and in structuring
the choices available to them, play a critical role in connecting public preference
to the preferences of elected officials, and thus, into policy. So, polarized politics,
in which elected Republicans line up in persistent conflict with elected Democrats,
is in some way indicative of key structural, institutional and behavioral features of
the American political system. More or less polarized parties must therefore reflect
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some underlying conditions that make polarization more or less likely. Such a line of
argument implies that polarized behavior by individual legislators must be a response
to the underlying electoral incentives faced by ambitious politicians. Party platforms
represent key poles, in-between which the constant tug-of-war of political competition
takes place, and voters exert their influence along the dimensions staked out by party
platforms.
Of course, constituents can also respond to the behavior of legislators – if the
party loyalty exhibited by a representative exceeds that which might be expected
or desired by constituents, many may choose to punish those legislators for their
relatively extreme partisan behavior. If this is true, then party loyalty and electoral
response could serve as a crucial mechanism of electoral accountability, as suggested
by Theriault (2005). This idea has an intuitive appeal – since parties structure
political conflict, one of the major ways that an elected official can transmit valuable
information to constituents is by being more or less strongly associated with a party.
In the case of U.S. House members, parties often line up on the opposite sides of key
roll-call votes – with most Republicans voting Yea, and most Democrats voting Nay,
for example. The differential willingness of members to support the party line on these
kinds of votes could thus serve a valuable purpose for a representative’s constituents.
Namely, the strength of a legislator’s association with a party’s agenda, as reflected by
a legislator’s willingness to support it on key votes, especially those that differentiate
the parties ideologically, could serve as a lever of electoral accountability. In this
way, legislators may be incentivized to adjust their degree of party support upward or
downward based on electoral feedback from their constituents.
2.2.1 Party, Constituency and Electoral Responsiveness
Indeed, there exists substantial empirical evidence that electoral accountability
functions as suggested above, in that legislators are often punished for developing
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records of party support that are “out-of-step” with the desires of their constituents.
In this view, voters in a legislator’s constituency punish them for actions that conflict
with their interests or preferences. Since elections are the main means by which voters
exert control over the behavior and composition of the legislature, it follows that this
control would be expressed via diminished margins of re-election, and when legislators
are sufficiently marginal, diminished probability of re-election. Canes-Wrone et al
(2002, 2007) find that legislators amassing voting records too ideologically extreme
for their tastes of their constituents are punished with diminished margins of safety
upon seeking re-election. Work by Carson et al (2010, 2014) establishes a similar
dynamic for party unity rates, indicating that legislators can face an electoral cost
for supporting the party too often.
Importantly, the above-cited work by Carson et al (2010) also establishes that
House members do respond to revocation of electoral safety with a greater rate of
defections from the party line in the next Congress. It has always been difficult
to determine the exact nature and extent of constituency influence on a legislator’s
party unity rate, owing to the fact that many legislators represent constituencies
whose interests are actually well-represented by the party, making it difficult to in-
fer a legislator’s relative ideological standing in their constituency based on their
relative ideological position within their party (Fiorina 1974). However, other lit-
erature on electoral responsiveness supports the idea that electoral considerations
determine the degree to which legislators are willing to associate with their party. In
particular, House members representing competitive districts demonstrate the most
responsiveness to constituency opinion (Griffin 2006). Also, even relative to expecta-
tions, extreme legislators are more likely to support the party line on roll-call votes
than moderates (Minozzi and Volden 2013). More broadly, there exists evidence that
representatives are strategic in their use of party symbols in campaigns (Neiheiser
and Neibler 2013), and that representatives elected from marginal districts are less
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likely to support messaging efforts from party leaders (Casas et al 2014). The general
picture that emerges is one in which House members are sensitive to the electoral
consequences of being closely associated with their party, and adjust their behavior
so as to be more in line with the preferences of their district over those of their party.
2.3 Party Organization of the U.S. House
From the above discussion of the electoral roots of partisan legislative behavior,
and the nature of legislator responsiveness to constituency preference, it is possible
to assemble a vision of how electoral accountability might operate through the con-
text of legislator association with the party. Parties structure electoral conflict, and
a representative’s degree of association carries strong information about how that
representative’s actions coincide with the interests of their constituents. Constituents
may punish their representatives for being too closely associated with their party’s
agenda by revoking some degree of electoral security from them, and even success-
fully re-elected legislators may respond to their newly perilous electoral circumstances
by distancing themselves from the party. In terms of roll-call votes, this should ex-
press itself in terms of the representative’s willingness to support the party on key
conflictual votes, which tend to pit one party against the other.
However, this story is complicated by the fact that parties also organize activity
in the House, including roll-call votes, so as to control the process of legislating. Since
this organization of the chamber is done, at least in part, to serve the interests of
the party’s contingent of elected officials (the party’s legislative caucus in the House),
the fact of partisan organization of the House raises the possibility that the actions
of legislative parties (in particular, through their chosen leaders) might mediate the
strength of the connection between constituency and legislator proposed above. To
understand how this may happen, it is worthwhile to consider why legislators organize
into parties, and what impact this may have on the observed behavior of the legislator.
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In this section, I consider the electoral value of the party brand name, the incentives of
legislators to protect the brand name by cartelizing control of the legislative process,
and how preference disagreement between members may affect the character of the
electoral and legislative function of party brands.
2.3.1 The Party as Brand-Name: Information, Signaling & Risk-Averse
Electorates
As discussed above, party labels provide valuable informational cues to voters
about the kinds of policies that an elected official may wish to implement. However,
the informational content of the party label, or “brand-name”, is not exogenously
given – rather, it is the product of choices made by the candidates running for election
under the banner of the party. The informativeness of the label comes from costly
affiliation with the party (Snyder & Ting 2002, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita
2008) – the more tightly ideologically constrained a party is, the more valuable is
the signal of affiliation with the party to voters attempting to discern the ideological
orientation of candidates for office. Additionally, even without costly affiliation, if
voters are risk-averse, then they will look more favorably on parties with lower ide-
ological heterogeneity, holding all else equal (Grynaviski 2006, 2010). This implies
that party leaders have an incentive to develop and maintain an informative brand
name by keeping their party relatively ideologically homogenous, and thus polarized
from the other party. This incentive applies both to party operations in reputational
development in the electoral arena (Stonecash 2012), and in “valence” protection in
the legislative arena (Butler and Powell 2014).
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2.3.2 The Party as Cartel: Collective Action Problems & Institutional
Solutions
Leaders also have a more concrete incentive to maintain tight togetherness among
members – a disciplined party, when in the majority, can cartelize legislative organiza-
tion and activity, ensuring that the resulting legislation produced by the chamber will
serve the interests of the party members (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007). Leaders
can do this by exerting control over the legislative agenda (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007,
Stiglitz and Weingast 2013), utilitizing party leadership offices such as party whips to
ensure that caucus members support the leaders’ legislative proposals (Burden and
Frisby 2005) and by arranging side payments for loyalty (e.g. financial support, as
in Cann 2008), especially for those who are harmed by the party’s activites (Jenkins
and Monroe 2012). In fact, it is likely that such regimes will have to exert discipline
on members to achieve their goals – the very nature of the collective action problem
faced by legislators is that the degree of cooperation on legislative initiatives in the
absence of party discipline is suboptimally low for party members. Individual legis-
lators may have strong incentives to defect from supporting party initiatives when it
is not in their electoral interests to do so, and leaders solve this problem by inducing
cooperation among members, and attempting to compensate them for the costs they
may bear from their cooperation.
2.3.3 Party Preference Agreement & Majoritarianism
Of course, if legislative parties organize to serve the interests of their members,
then it stands to reason that strength of the impact of that organization will likely
be affected by the degree of preference agreement present with the party’s elected
officials, as well as the nature of disagreement a party has with the other party in
the chamber. The theory of conditional party government (Rohde 1991, Aldrich and
Rohde 2001, Aldrich et al 2012) sums constituency-level concerns into a macro-level
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theory of party discipline discipline is described as a function of the distribution of
preferences between and within parties in the legislature. Similar claims about the
correlatedness of preferences being a key determinant of the nature of party organi-
zation of legislative activity are made by Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011). Alternatively,
in his theory of equilibrium party government, Patty (2008) describes the selection of
disciplinary regime as being determined by the net desire for discipline of the median
discipline demander in the party caucus. In both the theory of conditional party
government and the theory of equilibrium party government, the composition of the
party caucus is theorized to be the key to determining the discipline level either by
affecting the partys relative preference heterogeneity or by affecting the location of
the partys center of gravity with respect to preferences over discipline levels.
2.4 Toward a Model of Dynamic Discipline Selection, Legis-
lator Choice & Electoral Response
Generally speaking, legislative parties can be understood to produce a partisan
brand-name that aids in electoral competitiveness by addressing uncertainty regarding
a given candidate’s issue positions. This brand-name is built and protected through
leadership decisions that organize legislative institutions along partisan lines, using
those institutions to produce a legislative record to which the party brand-name
can be anchored. The electoral incentives of individual members may align more or
less strongly with each other, raising the possibility that the character of legislative
organization is epiphenomenal to underlying structure of interests between legislators.
The key takeaway from this discussion of party organization of legislative activity
is this: since legislative parties serve the interests of ambitious politicians, it is not
surprising that there are major connections between how parties organize a legislative
chamber and the nature of the interests held by those ambitious politicians. Many
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of these considerations, especially the re-election imperative, are the same as those
suggested to drive the relationship between constituency interests and legislator par-
tisanship. However, party institutions in the legislature are designed precisely with
the interests of re-election minded legislators at heart. So, to what extent does the
party mediate the electoral connection? Or, put differently, when will legislators re-
spond to cross-pressure between party and constituency by defecting from the party
line on roll-call votes? To answer this question, it will be necessary to model party
discipline regime selection jointly with legislator behavior and electoral feedback, as
will be described below.
2.4.1 Theoretical and Empirical Issues with a Unified Theory of Party
Discipline, Legislator Behavior & Electoral Accountability
While it may be intuitively attractive to connect internal and external factors
contributing to observed patterns of party unity, it raises the issue of identification
of the independent effects of each part in contributing to actual observations. The
fact that the willingness of individual members to cede disciplinary authority to party
leaders is often tied to the electoral incentives of the members has led many scholars to
question whether or not the considerations of member motivations adds anything to
an explanation of observed legislative polarization that electoral considerations alone
could not provide (see especially Krehbiel 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003). Such criticisms
fall most squarely on theories of party discipline that relate the ceding of disciplinary
authority to the degree of intraparty agreement (and inter-party disagreement) over
policy goals, such as the theory of conditional party government (Rohde 1991, Aldrich
and Rohde 2001).
However, closer readings of theories of party unity in legislatures reveal a some-
what more nuanced story Rohde (1991, p. 171) characterizes external conditions as
providing a “baseline” macro level of party unity, which is, in turn, augmented by dis-
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ciplinary actions taken by party leaders. In a similar vein, Thierault (2008) considers
the behavior of incumbent House members over the course of their careers, and finds
that incumbents exhibit more party unity in their voting behavior as time goes on,
a fact that one could plausibly attribute to increased electoral security for long-time
incumbents. In both cases, internal motivations of members augment the story that
could be told by considering their district’s socioeconomic makeup, ideological profile,
etc.
However, without an independent measure of district preference, uncontaminated
by party effects, it becomes difficult to isolate empirically the independent effects
of legislator party and district preference, respectively (McCarty et al 2001, Kre-
hbiel 2003). Thus, an issue of observational equivalence remains, and neatly parallels
to the theoretical objections to an independent party effect mentioned above. For
instance, consider Krehbiel’s (1991) “Majoritarian Postulate.” The Majoritarian Pos-
tulate states that, “Objects of legislative choice in both the procedural and policy
domains must be chosen by a majority of the legislature.” In other words, power
granted to parties within Congress cant be used to do things that a majority on the
floor wouldnt agree with, as they would revoke that authority (or never grant it in
the first place) if party leadership were to use that power in such a way. In this sense,
party institutions are governed by a sort of “remote majoritarianism” (Krehbiel 1998),
which makes them analytically and empirically superfluous in decision-making bodies
that select their rules internally by majority rule.
While the partisan institutions in each chamber of the U.S. Congress are clearly
endogenous at some level, it does not follow that they are epiphenomenal. After all,
individual members may value an institution that can force them to vote against their
true preferences, as such an institutions can also force co-partisans to do the same for
bills which a legislator favors (as noted above, Cox and McCubbins (2007) explain the
endowment of leadership with coercive power as solving just such a collective action
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problem.) While this possibility warrants consideration for a theoretical account, it
lends little potential empirical leverage that could be used to disaggregate the effects
on external and internal factors affecting observed party polarization.
However, there are three other principal issues with the remote majoritarianism
argument, all of which point the way to a theoretical reorientation of the relationship
between legislator and party, which can help to separate internal from external factors.
First, the decision to endow party leaders with disciplinary power is done some time
before the actual business of lawmaking. It would require remarkable foresight on the
part of party members to know the particular choices they would have to make when
cross-pressured between constituency and party. Therefore, it may not make sense to
suppose that any unwanted exercise of party discipline upon a party member would
be opposed, as this supposition requires the belief that the member would anticipate
this action, and object to a discipline regime on those grounds, before the fact.4
Second, a Congressperson may not necessarily face punishment for voting the
party line against the wishes of her constituents, as their constituents may not be
made aware about her decision to do. So, if we assume legislators may refuse to give
party leadership disciplinary authority so as to avoid being forced to vote against
their constituents’ wishes, we should remember that legislators might be able to “get
away” with holding the party line, without facing electoral punishment for doing so.
Additionally, if such punishment is to be brought down on a legislator, it is likely
to be done after the fact, as the principal actors responsible for calling attention to
legislator missteps are electoral challengers (Arnold 1990, Sulkin 2005). As discussed
4It may also imply that any objection by any member is sufficient to overturn a discipline regime.
While majority party nominees for Speaker have gone through with virtual intra-party unanimity
since the Civil War (Stewart 2000), floor votes on the Speakership occur after a candidate from the
majority party emerges with a majority of support within said party. It’s not clear that observed
majority party unanimity of floor votes for Speaker reflects actual unanimity within the majority
party caucus, due to a norm of procedural partisan loyalty that follows from ideological agreement.
In this spirit, Green (2005) presents evidence that suggests that the inclusion of votes involving
procedural partisan discord may overinflate measures of behavioral partisanship in Congress. The
implication is that legislators may make a distinction between loyalty on procedural and substantive
motions.
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above, electoral feedback serves as one of the main factors connecting legislator and
constituency feedback would be unnecessary if constituency desires could be accu-
rately represented in all situations, at all times.
Finally, and most importantly, the mechanism by which individual legislator in-
centives are aggregated into a collective choice has strong consequences for the ob-
servable results of any model deriving from such a theory. As noted above, there exist
at least two different theoretical approaches to party discipline regime selection mech-
anism those driven by caucus median preferences over discipline, and those driven
by leadership’s incentives to secure collective policy goals and maintain (or gain) ma-
jority status in the chamber. As will be elaborated upon in my modeling chapter,
these mechanisms will contain implicit substantive claims about whose preferences
are pivotal to leadership decision-making about disciplinary intensity. Taking these
substantively important linkages into account will enable the development of model
of discipline to identify party effects on behavior, and generate testable hypotheses
about the nature of party effects on roll-call behavior and electoral feedback.
As mentioned above, these considerations suggest an approach to party polariza-
tion in which intervening party institutions are modeled jointly with electoral feedback
to legislator behavior.
2.4.2 Moderates & Party-Constituency Cross-Pressure
Since parties can (roughly) be expected to pursue policy proposals to shift the
status quo toward the preferential “center of gravity” within the party, there will
always be “regulars” who represent constituencies with preferences that are more
extreme than the party’s policy proposals. While they are not necessarily rewarded
for loyalty to the party’s agenda, they will not be punished for it – empirically, at
least half of the majority party caucus in the U.S. House support the party’s agenda
nearly all of the time. Thus, intra-caucus variation in party unity rates is driven by
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deviations among moderate legislators, who may experience punishment from vigilant
constituents for supporting a party proposal that is not preferred by constituents to
the status quo. However, the relative willingness of caucus members to support the
party line on roll-call votes is also affected by the resources brought to bear by the
party in pursuing its goals. These resources are also electorally valuable, and can be
thought of as a performance bond5 for ensuring loyalty of cross-pressed members (as
in Patty 2008).
To determine the likelihood that moderate members will react to electoral vulner-
ability (as signaled by changes to re-election margin) by changing their party loyalty
rate, one must determine the conditions under which the party will decide to pres-
sure moderate members. One must also determine the likelihood that members will
submit to this pressure, given their current electoral vulnerability and the resources
on offer from the party. To assess these likelihoods, I propose a dynamic model of
party discipline regime selection, in which the shifting electoral security of individual
members affects both the willingness of leaders to discipline them, and their own
willingness to subsequently comply with party pressure to support a party’s proposed
policy changes (given the selection of disciplinary intensity, and the electoral incen-
tives faced by the legislator). Defection from the party line is understood to be a
response to electoral insecurity on the part of moderate legislators, and should be es-
pecially acute when this electoral insecurity is not addressed by appropriate changes
to the discipline regime.
2.4.3 Looking Ahead
The remainder of the dissertation project will proceed as follows. In Chapter 3, I
will propose a dynamic model of party leader decision-making, legislator vote choice,
and electoral feedback, with an eye toward elucidating the circumstances under which
5That is, resources held by leadership, and released in return for loyalty by legislators.
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cross-pressured moderates defect from the party line on roll-call votes. In Chapter
4, I use simulation techniques to evaluate the model, determining the circumstances
under which cross-pressured moderates can survive long enough to develop a more
moderate reputation. In Chapter 5, I test the model’s predictions in the aggregate,
focusing on the distribution of party unity rates across an individual party caucus
in each Congress as a function of electoral conditions faced by the party at that
time. In Chapter 6, I test the model’s predictions regarding individual legislator
adaptation, with special focus on how tenure and cross-pressure mediate the electoral
accountability relationship between legislators and their constituencies.
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CHAPTER III
A Dynamic Model of Party Discipline, Legislator
Behavior & Electoral Accountability
In the previous chapter, I discussed existing work on the electoral roots of legisla-
tive partisanship, and how endogenous legislative institutions mediate the connection
between voter preference and legislator behavior. The discussion was structured with
an eye toward motivating a dynamic model in which both of those relationships are
developed simultaneously and endogenously. I also considered how such a view could
help us explain the conditions under which cross-pressured moderates defect from
the party line on key roll-call votes. In this chapter, I propose a dynamic model
of party discipline, legislator vote choice and electoral feedback that can help de-
termine the conditions under which legislators cross-pressured between party and
constituency will side with the latter on roll-call votes. I begin by considering the
key characteristics that such a model should have, and identify the key outcomes
of interest and independent variables. I then introduce the conceptual basis of the
model, splitting model play into three constituent submodels that each correspond
to a decision-making environment for a single agent type in the model. I then pro-
ceed with a formal definition of the general model and the submodels, highlighting
important features of each along the way.
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3.1 Motivating the Model
As argued in the previous motivating chapter, explaining the strength of the re-
lationship between voter feedback and legislator behavior requires explicitly fleshing
out the electoral and legislative roles that the party plays in the legislator’s career.
Specifically, the party provides a brand name to which a legislator can anchor her
career, and the maintenance of the collective good of the brand name requires that
leaders hold resources in bond to assure an individual legislator’s support for the
party’s legislative agenda. These basic facts help to clarify the ways in which the
party mediates the relationship between the legislator and her constituents:
1. The party’s reputation helps legislators appeal to risk-averse voters, even if
(and perhaps because) that reputation is not located near the preferences of
the district’s median voter.
2. The party sometimes asks legislators to take difficult votes – votes in which the
legislator may feel cross-pressured between her party and her constituency.
3. The party can, in exchange for the legislator’s loyalty, help compensate her
for her trouble by handing over distributive resources, that aid in securing re-
election.
4. Finally, a legislator may choose defection from the party line, even if it means
adding short-term uncertainty to her ideological reputation, and foregoing dis-
tributive benefits from the party, if it is helps to insulate her from negative
electoral consequences from pursuing an agenda that is unpopular with her con-
stituents. Over time, defection from the party line may mitigate uncertainty
about a legislator’s ideological reputation, if it is done consistently.
The last of the four items deserves special attention, as it will be one of the
principal drivers of observed variance in party loyalty rates, both cross-sectionally
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(over the party caucus) and over time (for a given legislator, over the course of her
career).
The main purpose of the dynamic model developed in this chapter is to determine
the circumstances under which individual legislators receive negative electoral feed-
back for party support, and respond to that feedback by reducing their support for
the party’s legislative agenda. This relationship can differ under alternate assump-
tions about how the party operates, so appropriate specification of the individual
legislator’s incentives will require endogenous development of the mediating partisan
environment. This environment can involve both the party’s reputation (Snyder and
Ting 2002) as forged by its policy proposals, and the extent to which the party holds
distributive resources in bond to secure caucus-members’ support on difficult roll-call
votes (Patty 2008).
Thus, party discipline regimes, party reputations, legislative agendas and policy
outcomes must be grown endogenously within the model, and local legislator re-
sponses will co-evolve with those environmental variables. These processes will be
assumed to take place in an environment that has certain constant structural charac-
teristics that are taken as given. These characteristics will then be operationalized as
exogenous parameters, and the model will be assessed at a wide array of parameter
values. This will facilitate the development of testable hypotheses about the character
of legislator vote choice and responsiveness to constituency electoral feedback.
3.1.1 Key Features of the Model
The threads that have developed over the course of the preceding discussion can
be distilled into a single dynamic model of party leader decision-making, legislator
behavior and electoral response, which can in turn be broke into the three following
relationships:
1. Leaders of each party choose a discipline regime, based on a weighted combina-
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tion of the goals of majority maintenance and party preferences.
2. Legislators choose a rate of support for party positions on key, conflictual roll-
call votes.
3. Voters update their evaluation of the ideological reputation of their legislators,
and adjust their likelihoods of re-electing them accordingly.
Putting all three of these relationships in sequence has the effect of “closing the
loop” of model play, and enables the analyst to situate legislator behavior in dynamic
context. Dynamics matter, as they help to determine which model outcomes are stable
over time, and which are transient. Of particular interest will be the configurations of
model play that generate high cross-sectional variance in party unity rates – indicating
the presence of cross-pressured moderates within a party caucus, who have chosen to
defect from the party line. Determining the conditions under which this outcome can
occur will be key to elucidating the relationship between polarization and electoral
accountability.
3.1.2 What Will Not Be Modeled
There are at least a few considerations that are likely relevant to the modeling
of legislator behavior and electoral feedback that are not under consideration in the
present project.1
Agenda Formation While the theory thus far has focused on the positive agenda
power of parties (e.g. their power to promote positive legislative action through
the accumulation and selective re-granting of resources) the negative agenda powers
exercised by leadership (which are usually assumed to not vary with party strength
see Cox and McCubbins [2005]) may also have an impact on observed rates of party
1Though each may be promising ground for future extensions of the base model provided in this
chapter.
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loyalty. Such powers can affect the “denominator” in the unity rate equation by
preventing votes on which a majority of the majority party is rolled. Under Poole
and Rosenthals (2000) definition of party unity votes, such votes would qualify as
party unity votes, if they were allowed to happen. Indeed, there is some evidence
the nonrandom effects of negative agenda control do have an effect on measurable
characteristics of legislator behavior (Clinton 2012, Crespin et al 2013).
However, because a complete strategic accounting of the issues involved with
agenda formation by party elites would introduce substantial complication into the
model, I have chosen to omit such considerations. Instead, agenda generation will
be understood as controlled by a simple algorithm in which parties try to move the
status quo some degree toward the preferred policies of the party’s median legislator.
Majority & Minority Party Interaction, and Strategic Release More vexing
is the second (and related) question of minority party strength and influence within
the chamber. More specifically, if we assume that given a disciplinary intensity level,
the resources appropriated to pursue the partys agenda are employed efficiently (e.g.
employed to achieve passage of the bill within a simple majority, and not unneces-
sarily disciplining cross-pressured members to secure surplus votes,) then a theory of
minority party support for the majority partys agenda is required. This logical re-
quirement is bolstered by empirical findings that link majority party unity to minority
party unity (Lebo et al 2007).
However, as will be shown in the next chapter, the demands of parsimony require
simplifying leadership decision-making regarding disciplinary intensity to a straight-
forward function of electoral circumstances enjoyed by their members, as well as their
prospects for taking/retaining majority control in subsequent time periods. So, party
leaders will not be understood to be strategic in terms of releasing members from
obligations to vote for the party line. My approach with regard to majority and
29
minority parties will be to model each independently, assuming that they retain the
ability to schedule roll-call votes in rough proportion to their share of seats in the
legislature.
Party Asymmetry As McCarty et al (2006) point out, a large share of the total
increase in polarization in the later parts of the 20th century can be attributed to
the increasingly disciplined behavior of the Republican party. By their measures, the
increasingly uniform conservatism of the Republican party is not paralleled in degree
by increasingly uniform liberalism on the part of the Democratic party (despite the
decline of moderate Southern Democrats through most of the period). Chen and
Rodden’s study (2013) of electoral geography provides at least one possible expla-
nation for this – since Democrats tend to be clustered in densely populated urban
areas, Republicans tend to be advantaged elsewhere. Importantly, this implies that
Democrats need to compete and win in more ideologically hostile territories than do
Republicans, ensuring that Democrats are elected from constituencies that represent
a broader variety of policy preferences than are Republicans. This asymmetry in
electoral bases may help to explain subsequent asymmetry in party polarization be-
tween the parties. However, for the sake of analytical simplicity in the model, district
preference distributions will be understood to be symmetric.
3.2 Conceptual Strategy for the Modeling Project
Conceptually, the agent-based model of party discipline, legislator behavior and
electoral feedback described and implemented here can be understood as constituting
three distinct core functions – using the terminology of Railsback and Grimm (2011),
these can be called submodels. Each of these submodels is assigned to an agent,
which takes in information (in the form of selected aspects of the model environment
at that time, known as the state) and produces output that alters the state going
30
forward. These agent-submodel pairings are as follows:
• Party leaders, making decisions about the share of distributive resources avail-
able to the party that will be held in bond for legislator support on roll-call
votes, given the electoral circumstances that their members face.
• Legislators, making decisions about the rate at which they will support the
party position on roll-call votes, given their own electoral security, and given
the party’s decisions about discipline.
• Voters, making decisions about the probability with which they will re-elect
incumbent legislators, given the behavior of their representative.
Taken together, these three submodels define the state of the play in the model
in the next time step, t + 1 as a function of the state of the model in time t. In
combination with stochastic perturbations to electoral conditions, this model can
thus be understood as a Markov process, and the repeated application of the process
can be understood to be a Markov chain. As a result, output from a model run can
be analyzed as a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation that explores the
state space of the model over time, in a way that is equivalent to characterizing the
probability distribution of states, given a set of initial conditions (that is, the process
is ergodic).2
3.3 The Model
The model described below simulates a process of party decision-making, legislator
behavior and electoral feedback in a generic legislature with single-member districts
(inspired by the U.S. House). Districts are represented by single voters, who have
2Ergodicity also requires that the process be aperiodic and positive recurrent. More is said on
this in Appendix A.1.
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ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space. Parties draw candidates from recruit-
ment pools, and voters make choices over candidates probabilistically, based on the
distribution of their possible positions.
Having been elected, legislators from each party form caucuses, and set legislative
agendas that propose to move policy from the status quo toward the preferences of the
party. Party leaders then choose a degree of party discipline, holding some portion of
a pool of distributive goods in bond for adherence to the party’s legislative agenda.
Legislators subsequently choose the rate at which they will support the party’s agenda
on votes, and receive the appropriate percentage of resources back as a result.
Following this, new elections are held, and some percentage of incumbents run
for re-election. Incumbents running for re-election compete against a new challenger
drawn from the opposition party’s recruitment pool, while running on their own
perceived “brand”, which voters update based on the legislator’s voting record. A
new legislature is elected, and the process of discipline selection and roll-call voting
and electoral feedback begins anew.
The presentation of the model will begin with the initial setup. Then, each of
three submodels will be discussed, in turn.
3.3.1 Initial Setup and First Elections
Consider a jurisdiction divided into N constituencies, indexed i, each of whom
elects a single member to a legislature for that jurisdiction. Constituencies are
represented by a single voter, and have preferences xi, drawn from distribution
XC ∼ N(0, 1). Each seat in the legislature, indexed j, with j = i, is contested
by each of two parties, indexed k, where K = [D,R]. Initially, all seats are open,
and each parties select candidates from normal distributions unique to their party, so
that party D draws from candidates from:
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XD ∼ N(µD, σD) (3.1)
and party R draws from
XR ∼ N(µR, σR) (3.2)
.
For simplicity, set µR > 0, and set µD = −µR, and set σD = σR. Thus, party
recruitment pools are symmetric about the mean (0) of the constituency distribution.
Voters are aware of the nature of these recruitment pools, and have risk-averse
preferences over policy, assigning a quadratic loss function to the policies of party k
– that is,
Ui(xj) = −(xi − xK)2 (3.3)
over the distance of the mean position of the party from their own.3
Voters make the choice between candidates from each party probabilistically, with
respect to the magnitude of the difference in expected utilities from the candidates’
preferences. For voter i with preferences xi, the expected utility of a candidate xik
is given by:
EUi(xk) = −x2i + (2xi)µk + µk2 − σk (3.4)
so that the difference in expected utilities between draws of xD and draws of xR
is given by:
3Note that voters are interested in only the preferences of their potential representatives, and
later, in how the actions of an incumbent representative reflect on their preferences. They value
policy outcomes directly, but they are not strategic with respect to those outcomes – e.g. they won’t
elect a relatively extreme legislator with the idea of moving the policy agenda in their direction.
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Diffi = EUi(xR)− EUi(xD)
= 2xi(µR − µD) + (µ2R − µ2D) + (σ2D − σ2R).
which, since µD = −µR, reduces to:
Diffi = 2xi(µR − µD) + (σ2D − σ2R) (3.5)
Rearranging the terms in this way helps show one important property of this
calculation – the variance of party recruitment pools matters, due to the risk aversion
of the voters. In this way, even a candidate that had mean position further away
from the preferences of the district could be favored in an election against a closer
competitor, if there were more certainty about that candidate’s location.
Voters then make probabilistic vote choices, based on the difference in expected
utilities, using the logistic function:
fi,0(·) = P (Vote R)i = 1
1 + e−Diffi + Nt + it
(3.6)
where Diffi for voter i is calculated as above, and where Nt ∼ N(0, σN ) and
it ∼ N(0, σi) represent idiosyncratic factors affecting all national elections (e.g. a
national “wave” in election outcomes), and each individual constituency, respectively.4
The intuition represented in fi(·) is that there are diminishing marginal returns to
having an extreme advantage or disadvantage in terms of the difference in expected
utilities – once a candidate is, say, 99% likely to win, it is difficult for their chances to
improve much beyond that. This formulation also has the advantage of providing an
underlying probability of victory for the winning candidate – this can be interpreted
4Note that the inclusion of these error terms, drawn at each time t, imply that the model is
stochastic in nature. This will be important for later characterization of the model as a stochastic
process, specifically as a Markov process
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as corresponding to a comfortable victory, a close election, or even an upset. This
information about the likelihood of having been elected will be made available to the
winning candidates, and will be used to help determine their subsequent behavior in
the legislature.
3.3.2 Submodel A: Party Caucus and Leader Decision-Making
Once elections are completed, the winning candidates become legislators, and are
assigned to caucuses, based on their party. Before leaders set discipline levels, the
party must set an agenda for the time period. The caucus for party k in time t sets
an agenda akt, according to the following rule:
akt = θ(xKM,t) + (1− θ)(xSQ,t) (3.7)
where θ is an exogenously-defined constant parameter representing the nature of
policy demand or systemic agenda within the party’s ranks outside the chamber. The
status quo is initially set at zero, and is moved according to the success of legislation
in the chamber at the time.5 The completed legislative agenda will be constructed
out of bills from each party’s agenda, in proportion to their share of seats in the
legislature.6
Having set the agendas for each party, leaders representing each party set the
performance bond for their caucus members. This performance bond, denoted, bondkt
is equivalent to the share of a fixed pool of distributive resources, which can aid
legislators in securing re-election, whose total value is γ, that are contributed to the
5This conceptualization of policy change renders exogenous the role of the Senate and the Presi-
dent in the U.S. case – assume that the policy space in question represents something akin to what
can plausibly be accomplished, given the preferences of outside veto players.
6It should be noted that both the formulation of policy goals and the composition of proposals
forming the legislative agenda are simplified greatly here, so as to focus on the role of leadership in
setting party strength – setting the nature of proposals from each party’s leaders avoids the necessity
of including strategic motives in the leader’s decision-making, and gives the leader a single decision
output to focus on, as will be described below.
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party, and held in bond, until returned to members in proportion to their willingness
to support the party’s agenda on roll-call votes. Leaders make decisions about how
to set the performance bond based on the observed probabilities of securing victory
in two constituencies – the party median constituency (that is, the constituency that
sits at the ideological median of the set of seats held by the party), and the chamber
median constituency.7
Specifically, the function g(·) describes the leaders’ latent propensity to apply
discipline, and their subsequent decision-making, as follows:
Propensitykt(·) = α0 + α1(pt(xKM)) + α2(pt(xCM)) (3.8)
.
whereKM denotes the party median of party k, CM denotes the chamber median,
and the α’s are exogenously-defined constants. This propensity, in turn, is used to
help define bondkt = gkt(·) as follows:
gkt(·) = 1
1 + e−Propensitykt
(3.9)
The latent propensity to attach distributive goods to a performance bond is filtered
through the logistic function, so that the output bondkt = gkt(·) is a proportion,
corresponding to the percentage of party distributive resources held in bond.
The intuition about party leaders’ decision-making encoded above is that they face
conflicting incentives about whose interests to protect in guiding party actions in the
legislature. On the one hand, majority status is generally understood to be preferable
to minority status, and as such, responsiveness to one’s party’s chances at securing
the chamber median seat (and with it, a chamber majority, in expectation) should
7Including each of these targets in the weighting of disciplinary intensity is similar to the concep-
tual formulation in Cox and McCubbins [2007] , but assumes that the leader’s own electoral fortunes
are secure, and therefore not included in the calculation.
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matter greatly. On the other hand, leaders are also agents of their current party
caucuses, and may feel more compelled to respond to the electoral needs of the party
median. The value of α1 describes the degree to which the party median’s electoral
conditions affect the leader’s behavior, and the value of α2 describes the degree to
which the chamber median’s electoral conditions affect the leader’s behavior.
The difference between how the values of α1 and α2 affect leaders’ decision-making
can thus be understood, in the world of this model, to operationalize the difference
between theories of partisan organization that emphasize the leader as responsible
for advancing the policy preferences of the party caucus, and those that emphasize
the leader as responsible for maintenance of majority status (cleaving to the chamber
median as necessary to secure majority control). In contrast, α0 is an intercept, and
merely represents the baseline propensity of leaders to set performance bonds.
3.3.3 Submodel B: Legislator Vote Choice
Having set the parties’ agendas, and determined the intensity with which each
party will discipline its members to vote the party line (e.g. for their own agenda,
and against the other party’s agenda), it is up to individual legislators to determine
how often they will support the party. Legislators will make this determination with
respect to their own current electoral security, as well as the nature of the disciplinary
regime chosen by the party leaders.
Specifically, the latent propensity of legislator j to support the party’s agenda in
time t given by the following equation:
propensityjt = −βj0 + βj1pit + βj2γskt (3.10)
where β′is are permanent characteristics of the legislator, set at the individual leg-
islator’s initial election to the chamber, and are drawn from exponential distributions
with known and constant parameters. For instance, β0 ∼ Exp(β0, λ0) = λ0e−λ0β0 The
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permissible values for the λ’s are all positive, and all draws from these distributions
are strictly positive by definition. More will be said on the actual values used for the
λ’s in Chapter 4.
The underlying propensity calculated above helps to define legislator j’s loyalty
rate, ljt = hjt(·) as follows:
hjt(·) = 1
1 + e−Propensityjt
(3.11)
This logistic function yields a proportion ljt = hjt(·) as an output, which corre-
sponds to the rate at which legislator j supports party agenda items in time t.
The intuition behind the legislator’s decision-function is that each individual leg-
islator weights her own electoral security, and the promises of benefits from the party
in exchange for loyalty, differently, as well as having a different baseline propensity
to support to party, independent of the particular circumstances of time t. Note that
the legislator characteristics (βj0, βj1, βj2) vary from one legislator to another – one
key feature of the model is that these characteristics may play a key role in determin-
ing whether or not legislators are able to adapt to their circumstances well enough
to secure their continued re-election. This implies that the observed characteristics
of successfully re-elected legislators will likely be affected by the trajectory of model
play. Thus, one major endogenous output of the model will be the realized level of
responsiveness to electoral security for re-elected legislators. In this way, the model
incorporates both of Theirault’s (2005) conceptualizations of electoral feedback as
“the power of the people”, as it models both adaptation by individual legislators and
replacement of individual legislators.
3.3.4 Submodel C: Electoral Response to Legislator Reputation
After legislators set their voting behavior, a new time step begins, and a new
round of elections are held. These elections differ from the initial legislative elections,
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in that many of them will involve incumbent legislators, who will run on reputations
that are altered by their behavior while in the legislature. Alternatively, incumbents
retire with a positive probability ρ, in which case, open seat elections are held in the
same fashion as in equation (3.6).
The reputations of legislators seeking re-election are updated, according to a voter
weighting factor φ, and to their own chosen loyalty rate, ljt. These weights update
the mean and variance of voter placement of the legislator j from party k, such that:
µ¯j,t+1 = φ[ljtakt + (1− l)xsq] + (1− φ)µ¯j,t (3.12)
σ¯j,t+1 = φ[ljta
2
kt + (1− l)x2sq − (ljtakt + (1− ljts))2] + (1− φ)σ¯j,t (3.13)
The implication of the above equations is that, in voters’ minds, the strength of the
association of a legislator with her party’s policy pursuits is mediated by her loyalty
rate. This has two consequences for the legislator’s ideological reputation – the first is
that defections from supporting the party’s agenda will have the effect of pulling the
mean placement of the legislator more closely to the status quo policy, which is (almost
certainly) more moderate than the party’s agenda. The second is that defections from
the party’s agenda can introduce uncertainty in the legislator’s ideological reputation
– risk-averse voters may penalize them on net for this, depending on the value of
variance of their reputation vis a vis the mean. Note that this penalty would be
mitigated for a legislator that gains the reputation of usually bucking the party line
on key votes – such a legislator could be understood to develop a reputation as a
maverick, which would reduce uncertainty about their placement, even in the absence
of consistent association of the party agenda.
Voters then weigh this reputation (µ¯j,t+1, σ¯j,t+1) against a the prospect of a can-
didate drawn from the pool of the opposing party ∼ k. At this point, the party also
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upholds its end of the loyalty bargain, and returns distributive resources to legislators
in exchange for their realized loyalty rates. These resources can be understood as a
block-grant of valence-boosting goods that help legislators secure re-election, indepen-
dently of considerations of ideological reputation. Thus, the legislator’s reputation
and distributive bounty are taken to the re-election contest, where they are weighed
against the value of a fresh draw from the opposing party’s recruitment pool. For
example, consider a Republican incumbent, running against a Democratic challenger
– the latent electoral calculation, Diffit is computed:
Diffi = 2xi(µ¯j,t+1 − µD) + (µ¯2j,t+1 − µ2D) + (σ2D − σ¯2j,t+1) + (ljtγskt) (3.14)
and is translated into a re-election probability via the logistic function. Thus,
fi,t+1(·) = 1
1 + e−Diffi + Nt + it
(3.15)
.
of which the f0(·) presented in equation (3.6) was a special case, corresponding to
the initial situation in which legislators have no reputations or distributive resources
of their own. As noted above, in situations where the incumbent has retired, open
seat elections are held, again using equation (3.6) to determine the probabilities of
victory for each side.
3.3.5 Summing Up
Qualitatively, this model can be understood as a stochastic electoral process, from
which leadership decisions about disciplinary intensity and legislator choices about
loyalty rates follow, and then feed back into the electoral calculations of representative
voters. This understanding is depicted in Figure 3.1, situating functions f(·), g(·), and
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h(·), in terms of the location in the sequence of model play. Importantly, these three
functions jointly constitute a Markov process,8 and can be evaluated using MCMC
methods (Laver & Sargenti 2012).
In the next chapter, computational techniques will be used to simulate model play
across a wide variety of parameter values. These results will then be analyzed, to help
build up testable predictions about the relationship between electoral security and
party loyalty for cross-pressured legislators.
8See Appendix A.1 for more on this subject.
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Tables & Figures
Figure 3.1: Qualitative Diagram of Model Play.
Note the inclusion of stochastic elements (’s and ρ).
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CHAPTER IV
Simulating the Dynamic Model: Approach &
Analysis
In Chapter 3, I proposed a dynamic model of party discipline selection, legisla-
tor decision-making and electoral response which was designed to generate observed
relationships between electoral security and party loyalty, within the evolving con-
text of partisan organization of the legislature. The purpose of this model is to help
explain the conditions under which cross-pressured moderates may react to electoral
threat by increasing their rate of defection from the party line of roll-call votes. More
specifically, there are three questions that such a model should attempt to answer:
1. What factors can help explain the strength of the observed relationship between
electoral security and party loyalty?
2. When will differing levels of electoral security result in dispersion of party unity
scores across a party caucus? And, is this dispersion mainly driven by defections
from the party line by cross-pressured moderates?
3. How do the answers to these questions help us generate predictions about the
actual dispersion of party unity rates in the U.S. House, and about the attempts
of representatives to use defection behavior as a way of insulting themselves from
electoral threat?
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Analysis of the model should be conducted with these questions in mind.
In this chapter, I conduct such an analysis. I begin by setting up a theoretical
framework appropriate to the model proposed in Chapter 3, categorizing the vari-
ables in the model as key exogenous parameters of interest, tuning parameters and
endogenous variables. I propose a simulation strategy that samples combinations of
reasonable values for each exogenous and tuning parameter, and some correlation- and
regression- based methods appropriate to analysis of the results from the sample. I
then report on the results of the analysis, with a focus on explaining the conditions
under which cross-pressured moderates end up defecting from their party in large
numbers, thus causing high dispersion of party unity rates. I close with a discus-
sion of the implications of the findings for empirical analysis of legislator response to
electoral conditions in the U.S. House.
4.1 Setup & Conceptual Framework
Before beginning model analysis, it is first necessary to collect and categorize
conceptually all the quantities at play in the model. Generally, these fall into two
types – exogenous parameters, set at the beginning of model play and retaining their
value throughout, and endogenous variables, which fluctuate over the time steps in
model play, and jointly constitute the state of the model at a given time (as described
in Appendix A.1).
Conceptualizing variables in this fashion helps structure the analysis of an agent-
based model to render it analogous to the derivation of comparative statics of an
equilibrium solution in an equation-based model. Having achieved convergence on a
distribution of states, the covariance of endogenous output variables with exogenous
input parameters can be assessed. Since not all exogenous parameters are of equal
substantive interest, attention will be focused on a few of them, with the others
being treated as tuning parameters, that can be alternately understood as paring the
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parameter space explored by the model to one that bears a reasonable resemblance
to the actual relationship represented by the model, and as providing “robustness
checks” for inferences drawn from the model.
4.1.1 Collecting Quantities
Having laid out a now-tripartite distinction between exogenous parameters of
interest, tuning parameters, and endogenous variables, the equations from Chapter 3
can be mined to produce to following listings of each type of quantity in the model.
Exogenous Parameters of Interest
• Leadership Characteristics: α0, α1, α2
• Party Recruitment Pools: µD, σD, µR, σR
As described above, the first set of parameters to be collected are those exogenously-
set parameters that have important substantive content. Specifically, leadership char-
acteristics correspond to substantive claims about the nature of partisan organiza-
tion of American legislatures, most notably the U.S. House. Second, the parameters
defining the distribution of party candidates in the electorate correspond roughly to
structural forces external to the chamber than may have an impact on the ideological
uniformity and extremity of party nomination processes, and thus, on observed party
cohesion.
Tuning Parameters
• Electoral Disturbances, σ,N (national), σ,i (district)
• Agenda Ambitiousness, θ
• Size of Distributive Resource Pool: γ
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• Legislator Characteristics Distributions: λ0, λ1, λ2
• Retirement Rate, ρ
• Voter Updating, φ
In contrast to the primary parameters of interest, these remaining exogenous
parameters serve primarily as tuning parameters that help render the model useful as
a tool for capturing complex real-world dynamics. Any of these parameters may be
of further interest, and each could be analyzed for their own impact on model output.
Additionally, each is needed to tell the story that is implicit in the characterization of
model play above, in which voters and legislators co-adapt to each other’s behavior.
That said, it is necessary for the present study to limit detailed investigation to those
exogenous parameters that speak more directly to concerns related to the partisan
organizations of legislatures.
With this in mind, these remaining parameters will mainly be used to help pare
down the parameter space to “reasonable” proportions, rendering the inferences
drawn about the parameters of interest more sensible. This paring process will come
at some loss of generality, but the total impact of the tuning parameters will be char-
acterized thoroughly through uncertainty analysis, determining the degree of variance
in outputs of interest which can be attributed to variation in the tuning parameters,
and thus how robust the inferences drawn about the relationships between inputs of
interest and outputs of interest might be to changes in each tuning parameter.
Endogenous Variables
• Probability District i Votes Republican, pit
• Status Quo Policy = xSQ,t
• Party Policy Agendas akt
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• Share of Party Resources Held in Bond, skt
• Legislator Party Loyalty Rates, ljt
• Characteristics of Re-elected legislators, βj0, βj1, βj2
The endogenous variables mentioned above are the outputs of the model – of
particular interests are the electoral security of individual members (the pit’s) and
the legislators’ party loyalty rates (the ljt’s). In each case, each step of the model will
generate output for each district/legislator combination. Summarizing these data in
a manageable way is not only important for practical reasons of quick inference, but
also because the macro-level properties of party caucuses (e.g. the concentration of
electorally-insecure and disloyal members) are key targets for explanation.
In addition to the endogenous variables mentioned above, which are directly in-
volved in model play, a few other measures are collected, related to party turnover
and volatility in party control of the legislature. Specifically, these are the party bal-
ance of control in the legislature, the realized rate of retirement and the cumulative
tenure of sitting members of the legislature. With regard to the tenure measure,
both means and standard deviations will be taken, as party turnover (and thus,
electorally-induced variance in incumbent career duration), is likely to be concen-
trated in marginal electoral districts (i.e. most seats are likely to be “safe” for one
party or the other).
Finally, one last measure is introduced, to help characterize the distribution of
party unity rates across a party caucus. Specifically, the model will fit loyalty vectors
across caucuses to Beta distributions, in addition to taking the typical moments like
mean and standard deviation. This is because the Beta distribution is well-suited to
characterize proportion data that “bunch” toward one end of a finite interval, while
retaining the flexibility to detect other patterns (e.g. those with more central modes,
or flatter and more uniform patterns of distribution).
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More will be said about the properties of the Beta distribution in the next chapter,
but the distribution is given by:
f(x;α, β) =
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
xα−1(1− x)β−1 (4.1)
.
The shape parameters α and β can be rearranged to produce a pairing of mean
and dispersion parameters, denoted (µ, φ), where
µ =
α
α + β
, φ = α + β (4.2)
The value of the dispersion parameter, φ, is of particular importance, as it helps
capture the “sharpness” of change in the distribution function around the mode of
the distribution. This “sharpness” indicates the degree of dispersion in the loyalty
rates between one part of the party caucus and another part of the party caucus, thus
providing a very good heuristic for differential willingness of legislators to support
the party line – potentially caused by defecting, cross-pressured moderates.
Examples of probability distribution functions for different values of Beta(α, β)
are given in Figure 4.1. As can be seen, distributions with the same ratio of α to β
have means in similar places, and modes in (roughly) similar places. As the value
of φ = α + β, increases, the concentration of points around the mode intensifies,
indicating a tighter clustering of party loyalties around the modal point. Greater
levels of dispersion, associated with lower levels of φ, indicate the willingness of large
swathes of the party caucus to vote with loyalty scores that differ greater from the
mean or from the mode. Since scores are generally concentrated to one side of the
distribution, as they are in each of the examples, this dispersion generally means that
some subset of legislators are voting with the party less often. Thus, the value of φ
is a good indicator of dispersion – low levels of φ imply high levels of dispersion.
48
4.1.2 Outcomes of Interest
As mentioned above, the main purpose of the model described is to generate
conditions under which cross-pressured legislators decide to defect from supporting
the party line on roll-call votes, thus causing dispersion in party loyalty rates across
a caucus. As will be made clear in the next section, this can be understood in terms
of three conditions being satisfied:
1. Moderate members are strongly cross-pressured between constituency and party
– that is, they have large differences of preference from the center of their party,
and are strongly pressured by the party disciplinary regime to support the party
in pursuing its objectives.
2. Moderates choose to react to cross-pressure by siding with their constituents,
and defecting from the party line on roll-call votes.
3. Moderates survive their re-election campaigns to continue casting votes at a
low rate of party unity.
Each of these pieces of the story will be investigated throughout the analysis of
simulation results, and will be integrated to draw inferences from the model as a
whole. Of these three conditions, numbers 1 and 3 are of particular interest. Condi-
tion 1 is of interest, because it highlights the conditional nature of cross-pressure –
depending on the configuration of electoral circumstances within a party, as well as
the incentives faced by party leaders, the degree of cross-pressure faced by moderates
may vary greatly. This reflects the importance of modeling party discipline regime
selection jointly with legislator decision-making, as the former can have an important
conditioning effect on the latter. Condition 3 is also of interest, because it highlights
the importance of the dynamic perspective – members who engage in behaviors that
are electorally disadvantageous are unlikely to be re-elected, which places a powerful
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filter on the kinds of outcomes that are theoretically sustainable. As will be seen be-
low, the electoral feedback that is implicit in this dynamic setup will have important
implications for the kinds of inferences that can be drawn about the vote behavior of
cross-pressured moderates.
4.1.3 Key Independent Variables
From the discussion above, two key sets of independent variables can be isolated,
which will be operationalized in the model as exogenous parameters. They are:
1. Preference distributions within the recruitment pools of each party.
2. The relative importance placed by leaders on securing majority status and serv-
ing the wishes of a majority of their own party (which may be in conflict, as in
Cox and McCubbins 2007).
Both of these sets of variables are important, because they relate directly to the
determination of the character of discipline regime enacted by each party at each
point in time. These decisions by a legislator’s party, combined with the preferences
of a legislator’s district, determines the extent of cross-pressure faced by an individual
legislator. Thus, they will likely be important in explaining the observed connection
between electoral security and party loyalty, and how that connection may vary from
one legislator to another.
4.2 Strategy for Analysis
Having laid out the main questions to be addressed by the model, and having
described the main types of parameters and variables at play in the model, a strategy
for systematic exploration of the model must be set out. In general, the first goal
will be to correlate realized values of endogenous variables from model play to the
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values of exogenous parameters, whose values are set at the beginning of each model
run. The second goal will be to correlate the observed values of relevant endogenous
variables to each other. This will be accomplished by simulating the model at different
combinations of parameter values, running the model until “burn-in” is achieved, and
then averaging observed values of the endogenous quantities of interest. Each run will
thus constitute an entry in a dataset, and correlation- and regression-based methods
can be used to connect variance in the run-average values of one quantity to the
run-average values of another.
In this section, the averaging behavior described above is justified by discussing
some useful properties of the model – especially the model’s ergodicity. Then, a
strategy for the sampling the parameter space is laid out, and some technical notes
on implementation of the model are given.
4.2.1 The Markov Property, Ergodicity & Model Analysis
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 3, this model can be understood as a stochastic
process, and one that has the Markov property, in that the transition probabilities
from one point in the space of model play depend only on the previous state of the
model. Additionally, the model is positive recurrent, meaning that it can move from
point on the space of model play to any other point in any time step, with at least some
positive probability.1 Finally, the model is ergodic, which means that distribution of
system behavior over time will be the same as the probability of behavior averaged
over the state space of the system described the chain at any given time.
Intuitively, the importance of the ergodic property can perhaps best be character-
ized by what the model is not. The model is not path dependent since, like all Markov
chains, it is memoryless – only the current state of the system matters to determining
to future trajectory of the system. Additionally, the model has no absorbing states
1This, along with other key aspects of the Markovian nature of the model are discussed in
Appendix A.1.
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– because of the stochastic nature of the electoral response function, all possible out-
comes have a positive probability of occurring (however small) in any time step of the
model. Together, these paint a picture of a model that avoids the pitfalls of multiple
equilibria that would complicate inductive assessment of the expected values of model
output, given parameter inputs.
Moreover, these properties should bolster the “good behavior” of expected val-
ues of model output within a local environment of a point in the parameter space.
This renders viable derivative- and regression-based methods of sensitivity analysis of
model output, greatly simplifying the task of determining the relationships between
inputs and outputs. It also bolsters the case for Monte Carlo sampling over the pa-
rameter space, as there is less need to do multiple runs at any given point in the
parameter space to check for path dependence or multiple equilibria. This reduces
the size of computational “experiments” to explore the parameter space by several
orders of magnitude, and renders data analysis more manageable with conventional
means.
As discussed by Marino et al (2008), uncertainty in the results from an agent-
based model like the one under consideration can have two sources. The first is called
epistemic uncertainty, and refers to uncertainty caused by variation in the input
parameters. The second is called aleatic uncertainty, and refers to the uncertainty
caused by stochastic components that are inherent to the model. As mentioned
above, the purpose of designing the simulation under consideration as a Markov-
Chain Monte Carlo process was to make sure that model output was “well-behaved”
– by eliminating path dependence, and reducing model play to state dependence, the
necessity of conducting multiple runs for a given set of parameter values was reduced.
That is, the expected behavior of a given run of a model, averaged over time, should
provide a good approximation of probability that the model would exhibit any given
output in any given step.
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Put differently, this implies that the aleatic uncertainty in the model is unlikely
to have a substantively important effect on results from the set of simulation runs.
Thus, we can be reasonably confident that observed uncertainty in model output is
due is epistemic in nature.
4.2.2 Methods for Data Analysis
The suite of methods used for the analysis of data from computational simu-
lations is sometimes referred to as global sensitivity analysis (Saltelli et al 2008).
Global sensitivity analysis for the simulation results will be conducted through two
main channels: partial rank-correlation coefficients and rank-fitted regression (as rec-
ommended by Marino et al 2008). Rank-based methods are used, since each of the
mathematical relationships incorporated is filtered through some variant of the logis-
tic function. This implies that while the expected relationship between an input and
a related output will be monotonic, it will not be linear. Rank-based methods are ro-
bust to non-linearities in relationships, even in terms of partial correlation, provided
that the inputs are independent from one another.
4.2.3 Sampling the Parameter Space
The approach of the following analysis is to establish minimum and maximum
values for each parameter, as seems intuitive, to define each dimension of a parameter
space, which is equivalent to the span of the dimensions. These values are displayed
in Table 4.1. The model is run 10,000 times, and for each run, values for each
parameter are chosen independently from a uniform distribution, bounded by the
respective minimums and maximums given.
In some cases, it as difficult to develop an a priori justification for the bounds in
question – ancillary experiments (not shown here) were used to determine which, if
any, values for exogenous parameters had the effect of “breaking” the model. With
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this in mind, the values chosen should give a good accounting of the behavior of the
model within reasonable segments of the parameter space.
4.2.4 Notes on Implementation
The model was coded in Python 2.7, and makes use of the NumPy and SciPy
packages for data management and statistical support, respectively. There are three
primary files involved with running a simulation – the main file is a model class,
which is instantiated at different parameter values. Voters and legislators are also
distinct classes, with a set of the former created once at the beginning of the run,
and with the latter created as members win election and are subsequently replaced.
Since there are only two party leaders, their decision-functions are hard-coded into
the model class. Runs of the model class are executed for 1000 time steps, and model
output is recorded for the final 500 steps. Difference-of-means tests (not reported)
on key endogenous quantities were conducted to assess the quality of convergence, as
suggested for MCMC processes in Gill (2002) .
4.3 Results
The goal of analyzing the simulation results is to assess variation in the strength
of the relationship between electoral security and party loyalty. Of particular interest
are factors and dynamics that can explain when party caucuses exhibit a great deal
of dispersion in party loyalty, as this suggests that members who feel substantial
electoral threat are defecting from the party line as a way of insulating themselves
from being punished by constituents for being too closely associated with their party.
To further consider this possibility, the intensity of party-constituency cross-pressure
will also be assessed, with special attention paid to the impact that cross-pressure
has on legislator defection behavior. Additionally, since the model is dynamic, the
frequency and causes of legislator defeat will be considered, as will their implications
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for the observed rates of electoral security and party loyalty among the survivors.
The basic picture that will emerge from this analysis is that the the endogenous de-
termination of party discipline will explain the conditions under which cross-pressured
moderates defect. Under low levels of cross-pressure, moderates will feel little need
to defect. Under moderate levels of cross-pressure will feel the need to defect and do
so. Under high levels of cross-pressure, they will feel the need to defect but will fail
to secure re-election.
4.3.1 Summary Statistics & Basic Correlations
Analysis of simulation results begins with a basic recounting of means and stan-
dard deviations of key endogenous variables, which are presented in Table 4.2. Since
results are symmetric with respect to the parties, only the figures for Republicans
are reported, with no loss of generality.2 Legislators are re-elected with a mean prob-
ability of 74.6%, and with a mean probability of 81.2%, suggesting that there is a
rightward skew in the distribution of re-election probabilities. Legislators vote with
their party about 52.0% of the time, and averages measures of dispersion (standard
deviation and φ) indicate that a fair amount of variation in loyalty exists on average.
Also of note is the fact that observed legislator sensitivity characteristics all come in
higher than 1, which was the mean value for each parameter, indicating that at least
some selection based on legislator sensitivity is occurring in model play.
More important than absolute values of endogenous variables, though, is how they
are related to exogenous parameters – this is especially useful as a validity check, to
see if the model behaves in ways that seem sensible, given the underlying equations in
play. Table 4.3 presents partial rank correlation coefficients for endogenous variables
on exogenous parameters, and Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the partial rank regression
coefficients for the same set of outputs and inputs. Since the results from each method
2Investigation by the author indicates that the results are substantively identical for Democrats
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tell the same basic story, the focus will be on Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Of particular interest in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are the exogenous parameters that
are strong predictors of legislator re-election probabilities or legislator loyalty rates.
As would be expected, mean Republican district extremity (listed as “Mean Rep.
Dist. Pref.” on the table) is positively associated with mean Republican re-election
probability and negatively associated with the standard deviation in re-election prob-
abilities – this indicates that favorable electoral territory for Republicans has the
effect of making re-election more uniformally secure for Republicans. This doesn’t
translate into more uniform loyalty, though – while mean party loyalty is higher given
more favorable electoral terrain, the variance in party loyalty also goes up, as indi-
cated by the positive coefficient for Mean Republican Position on both the standard
deviation of loyalty rate, and the negative coefficient in the equation for φ (since lower
values of φ indicate more dispersion).
Variation in the favorability of electoral terrain (“SD Rep Dist. Pref.”) is not
significantly related to the mean or variance of party loyalty rates, indicating that
something endogenous to model play must be driving observed distributions of party
loyalty rates. This intuition is reinforced by the fact that the exogenous factors that
contribute to the extent of possible discipline – the size of the resource pool (“Resource
Max”) and the willingness of leaders to increase discipline, given electoral security
of the chamber median (“Mean Leader Parameter 1”) and the party median (“Mean
Leader Parameter 2) – are positively associated with mean disciplinary intensity and
mean party loyalty, but also with the standard deviation of party loyalty. This sug-
gests that party discipline may have the effect of increasing mean loyalty while also
increasing dispersion of loyalty scores. More will be said on the effect of discipline
regimes on creating cross-pressure for moderates below, but these findings would be
consistent with the possibility that party discipline regimes enhance the loyalty of
relatively extreme partisans while forcing defections from more moderate members.
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The purpose of the remaining discussion will be to show how endogenously-derived
discipline regimes can produce dispersion in party loyalty rates. First, the basic
observed relationship between electoral security and party loyalty will be assessed.
Then, the direct contributions of electoral security to party disciplinary intensity will
be considered in more detail. Next, the modifying effect of disciplinary cross-pressure
on the relationship between security and loyalty will be examined. The analysis will
conclude with the role of cross-pressure in producing electoral turnover.
4.3.2 Party Loyalty As A Function of Electoral Security
Deeper analysis of the connections between endogenous model quantities begins
with the two that are most important – electoral security and party loyalty. The
two scatterplots in Figure 4.2 show the relationship between mean security and mean
loyalty, and between the standard deviation of electoral security and dispersion in
party loyalty scores (φ). While there exists a mild positive relationship between
mean security and mean loyalty, no such positive relationship exists between variance
in electoral security and dispersion in loyalty rates. This suggests that variation in
the observed degree of electoral security enjoyed is not sufficient by itself to explain
when a high degree of dispersion in loyalty rates will be observed.
These results are confirmed by partial-rank regression analysis, as shown in Table
4.6. In these equations, mean loyalty rate and mean φ fit are regressed on measures of
observed re-election security, and a complement of exogenous controls (not all shown).
Here, we can see that mean re-election probability actually is negatively associated
with φ, suggesting that whatever causes increases in mean electoral security may be
also causing increased dispersion in loyalty rates. Once again, the exogenous param-
eters responsible for discipline potential – resource maximum, and leader parameters
1 and 2 – are also negatively associated with φ. While the standard deviation of
re-election probability is, ceteris paribus, associated with lower values of φ, the fitted
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values of φ are not, as shown in Figure 4.3.
Taken together, these results continue to suggest that an individual legislator’s
electoral considerations alone are not sufficient to explain when will see high dispersion
in observed party loyalty rates. This makes sense, considering that a legislator’s
electoral conditions are not the only thing determining their choice of party unity rate
– party disciplinary regimes mediate the legislators choices in this regard. In the next
section, this mediating effect will be assessed by looking first at the role of electoral
security in party disciplinary intensity, and then at the role of disciplinary intensity
in producing observed patterns of loyalty rates, given electoral security distributions.
4.3.3 Party Discipline & Cross-Pressure: Effects on Observed Loyalty
Dispersion
There are two steps to the process by which party discipline can have a mediating
effect on the relationship between electoral security and party loyalty – first, electoral
security values for party members play a role in determining the disciplinary inten-
sity chosen by leaders, and second, disciplinary intensity affects the future electoral
fortunes of members, conditional on how often they vote with the party (and thus,
how much of the distributive resource bond they get back for use in re-election ef-
forts). Starting with the former, Figure 4.4 illustrates the connections between mean
and standard deviations in electoral security and mean party discipline levels. While
mean electoral security is positively associated with higher mean levels of disciplinary
intensity, the standard deviation of electoral security enjoyed by party members does
not appear to be.
The results of a partial-rank regression analysis designed to determine the effect
of electoral security on mean disciplinary intensity, reported in Table 4.7, tell a some-
what different story. As shown in column 1, both the mean and standard deviation
in party discipline rates are positively associated with party disciplinary intensity.
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One possible explanation for this is that the increases in electoral security that are
responsible for higher disciplinary intensity are mainly being enjoyed by more secure
members. If this were true, we would expect that the effect of leader parameter 2
(sensitivity to the security of the party median member) would be conditional on
both mean and variance in electoral security, whereas the effect of leader parame-
ter 1 (sensitivity to the security of the chamber median member) would not be. As
shown by the coefficients on the interactive terms in equation 2, this is in fact the
case. The marginal effects for mean electoral security and party discipline are plotted
in Figure 4.5, to give an example of this difference. Considering that the model is
dynamic, it is likely that at least some of this increase in electoral security for more
extreme party members comes from prior compliance with the disciplinary regime –
disciplinary intensity would appear to be a boon for extreme members, but not so
much for moderate members.
So, do moderate members defect in response to the cross-pressure induced by
more intense disciplinary regimes? More specifically, does disciplinary intensity mod-
ify the relationship between electoral insecurity and increased party loyalty? Table
4.8 estimates several equations designed to determine the nature of the relationship
between party discipline and mean φ fit. The fullest specification, given in Equation
3, indicates that the interaction between mean discipline and variance in re-election
probabilities (which we now know indicates the presence of cross-pressure moderates)
has a negative effect on φ – indicating increased dispersion. However, the interaction
between the square of mean discipline and variance in re-election probabilities has a
positive effect on φ, indicating decreased dispersion.
The marginal effect of cross-pressure (e.g. variance in re-election probabilities)
upon party loyalty dispersion (φ) is plotted in Figure 4.6. As can be seen, electoral
threat has a positive effect of φ, indicating less dispersion in loyalty rates, at low and
high levels of disciplinary intensity, but a negative effect at moderate rates.
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4.3.4 Closing the Loop: Legislator Survival
The preceding results raise the question: why is the relationship between dis-
ciplinary intensity and party loyalty dispersion curvilinear? That is, why do we
observe substantial numbers of cross-pressured moderates defecting at moderate lev-
els of discipinary intensity, but not at high levels? There are at least two possible
answers to this question: either high disciplinary rates are sufficient to induce compli-
ance among moderate members and subsequently help them secure re-election or the
cross-pressure faced at high disciplinary intensity is too strong, and moderates can’t
survive, thus getting eliminated from the simulation run. If the former is true, then
the combination of high disciplinary intensity and electoral threat should enhance the
chance of survival for incumbent legislators. If the latter is true, this combination
should hurt the chances of survival for incumbent legislators.
Table 4.9 confirms that the latter explanation is right. Equations 1, 3 and 5 es-
timate the effects of the combination of electoral threat and disciplinary intensity on
mean incumbent defeat rate, mean legislator tenure and the standard deviation of
legislator tenure. The combination of the two factors is positively associated with de-
feat probability and negatively associated with mean legislator tenure. Importantly,
this combination is also associated with increased variance in tenure for sitting legisla-
tors, indicating an uptick in recently elected legislators, resulting from more electoral
churn. Figure 4.7 plots mean incumbent defeat rates and variation in accumulated
tenure by both electoral threat and party discipline. In both cases, the safest quartile
is low on both measures, and the least safe quartile is high on both measures.
Equations 2, 4 and 6 show the effect of φ on electoral turnover – in each case,
lower values of φ are security enhancing, indicating that defection does work as an
insulation/survival strategy when moderates can get away with doing it.
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4.4 Discussion & Conclusions
The results of the model can be summarized as follows. Exogenous electoral cir-
cumstances are not sufficient to generate the observed dispersion in party loyalty rates
that would signal increased moderate defections. The endogenous determination of
party disciplinary intensity plays a key role in determining the loyalty behavior of
moderate legislators – higher disciplinary intensity works primarily to the electoral
benefit of loyal extremists within the party, while inducing defections from cross-
pressured moderates (thus, observed dispersion in unity rats goes up). When disci-
plinary intensity is high enough, moderates can’t survive their re-election campaigns,
and so dispersion goes down due to their absence from the party caucus.3
Put differently, the picture of endogenous party discipline that emerges from the
model is one that can be adequately characterized in three rough “output regimes”
summarized in the following way:
1. A low discipline, low security variance regime. Legislators representing mod-
erate districts feel relatively little electoral threat from supporting the party’s
agenda, and have no trouble supporting it. Resulting party loyalty dispersion
rates are low.
2. A moderate discipline, moderate security variance regime. Legislators repre-
senting moderate districts feel some cross-pressure between their district and
their party, as reflected in their more tenuous electoral circumstances. They de-
sire to insulate themselves from the potential dangers of being associated with
the party’s agenda, and raise their defection rate on roll-call votes. Resulting
party loyalty dispersion rates are high, since moderates survive by developing a
reputation independent from the party’s agenda.
3Theriault (2006) evaluates the extent to which a replacement dynamic can explain contemporary
partisan polarization.
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3. A high discipline, high security variance regime. Legislators representing mod-
erate districts feel major cross-pressure between their district and their party,
as reflected in their much more tenuous electoral circumstances. They desire
to insulate themselves from the potential dangers of being associated with the
party’s agenda, but are unable to survive being tied to their party, regardless
of their behavior. They are defeated at high rates, before they can develop an
independent reputation. Resulting party loyalty dispersion rates are low – the
surviving members are those that don’t see much need to defect from the party
line in order to safely secure re-election.
This third scenario is unlikely to actually obtain in the real world case of the U.S.
House. (seeing as it would likely imply a substantial and constant amount of electoral
turnover that is implausible in that case). But, it still tells us something important
about the behavior of cross-pressured moderates – namely, that their incentive to
defect is conditioned by the degree of cross-pressure that they experience and that
their capacity to defect is conditioned by electoral survival.
So what does the model say about the conditions under which legislators repre-
senting moderate districts choose to adapt to electoral cross-pressure by defecting
more often from the party line on roll-call votes? The answer given is that these
legislators will defect when:
1. They feel the need to do so to preserve their own ideological reputation and
electoral survival, and
2. They can survive long enough to do so.
In terms of the accountability of the legislator to her constituents, this can be
explained with Theirault’s (2005) framework – when adaption fails, replacement kicks
in. The making of this particular inference about the observed rates of connection
between electoral threat and deviation from the party line is made possible by the
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dynamic nature of the model, which takes into account electoral reaction to legislator
behavior in determining what behaviors are likely to emerge from model play.
The first condition is largely a calculation that is likely to be determined in iso-
lation, based on the legislators’ own electoral relationship with their district. The
latter condition, however, is the part that is mediated by the composition of their
caucus. Note that the most dangerous time to represent a moderate district in the
model is when discipline is high and security variance is low. Each suggests a situa-
tion in which the majority of one’s own party is relatively electorally secure, as mean
electoral security is positively related to both disciplinary intensity and variation in
security rates. This secure portion of the party can push for a more extreme party
agenda, and moderates will struggle to survive being associated with it.
There are at least two major testable implications that come from the results of
this model. These are:
1. Observed degrees of dispersion in party loyalty rates are a phenomenon that is
determined at the caucus level, by the divergence in interests between more and
less secure members.
2. Moderates have the ability to insulate themselves from the effects of being
associated with an unpopular agenda, but this ability is likely to be conditional
upon intensity of cross-pressure, and upon their own tenure in the legislature.
The latter implication is somewhat less obvious from model results, but it does
follow from the discussion of electoral turnover. Moderate legislators have to be
able to survive long-enough to establish a consistent pattern of defection associated
with holding more moderate views. High rates of defection are a liability for less
well-tenured members, as they increase uncertainty about the legislator’s preferences.
Thus, tenure should have a mitigating role in the relationship between electoral secu-
rity and party loyalty – longer-tenured members are proven ideological commodities
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who have less need to respond sharply to electoral conditions as a result.
Chapter 5 will discuss the way in which party composition affects observed dis-
persion in party unity rates in the U.S. House. Chapter 6 will briefly discuss how
cross-pressure and legislator tenure moderate the observed connections between elec-
toral security and party loyalty, and between party loyalty and electoral survival, for
individual House members.
4.4.1 Possible Issues & Extensions
As with any model, a few major trade-offs had to be made in order to isolate the
key intra-party dynamics of interest. The first is in the exogenous imposition of a
legislative agenda, which is determined by the agenda ambitiousness parameter. This
was done in order to reduce party leader decision-making to single, endogenous quan-
tity – the intensity of discipline, as operationalized by the share of party distributive
resources held in bond for loyal performance on roll-call votes. It is entirely possible
that a leader may choose to pursue a moderate agenda with all potential resources
at hand, or may pursue an extreme agenda while committing very few resources to
actually achieving it. Characterizing mean and variance of loyalty behavior over a
two-dimensional space of simulated leadership choice would have been very difficult,
though, and so the agenda was not conceptualized as an independent, “moving” piece
of the model.
Additionally, the ideological space considered in the model is unidimensional. Con-
sidering that much of the disagreement with parties may occur along secondary ide-
ological dimensions (e.g. McCarty et al 2006, focusing on bimetallism and racial
issues), it may be a consequential decision to omit the possibility of cross-partisan
roll-call coalition-making (with the concomitant lowering of party loyalty scores that
would follow from such votes). However, since the focus of the model was on party dis-
cipline levels, and party discipline tends to compress observed issue spaces to a single-
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dimensional space, anyway (see Rohde et al 2005, Kalmoe n.d.) this was deemed an
unnecessary complication for the present study. The possibility of considering the
viability of a second ideological dimension as being a proxy for party power or homo-
geneity shouldn’t be ruled out, though – because of this, a multidimensional extension
of the model may yield some interesting results.
Finally, the model assumes symmetry in the expected means and variances in
party recruitment pools and in the underlying preferences of Congressional districts.
This assumption may not stand up to empirical scrutiny, and it may be of consequence
to the results of the simulation, as it’s not clear how sensitive the behavior of one
party is to the electoral conditions of the other, and vice versa. Since the model of
roll-call behavior generation does not involve any strategic considerations, I have ruled
out the possibility that one party’s loyalty rates may be conditional upon the others
(which is important to some stories of observed loyalty rates, see Lebo et al 2007.)
fleshing out both the basis of party recruitment pools and the structural asymmetry
in the party’s bases of electoral support may help to explain some of the differences
in resulting inter- and intra-party dynamics across parties and over time.
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Tables & Figures
Table 4.1: Exogenous Parameter Values Included in Experiment.
Parameter Symbol Minimum Maximum
Mean Democratic Candidate Position µD -2 0
St. Dev. Democratic Candidate Position σD 0 1
Mean Republican Candidate Position µR 0 2
St. Dev. Republican Candidate Position σR 0 1
Resource Max γ 0 1
Agenda Ambition θ 0 1
Voter Updating λ 0 1
Retirement Rate ρ 0 .2
St. Dev. National Electoral Shocks σ(Nt) 0 1
St. Dev. District-Specific Shocks σ(it) 0 1
Leader Parameters A = (α0, α1, α2) 0.5 1.5
Legislator Parameters B = (β0, β1, β2) 0.5 1.5
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Model Output, Republicans Only, Averages of
Model Run-Averages (Last 500 Steps)
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Electoral Security
Mean Re-Election Probability .746 .071 .421 .948
SE Re-Election Probability .235 .054 .056 .409
Median Re-Election Probability .812 .089 .387 .997
Party Decision-Making
Party Agenda .309 .256 −.227 1.612
Disciplinary Intensity .574 .097 .308 .823
Legislator Behavior & Characteristics
Mean Loyalty Rate .520 .078 .297 .793
SE Loyalty Rate .228 .026 .154 .336
Mean β0 1.114 .331 .494 2.233
SE β0 1.081 .337 .514 2.480
Mean β1 1.193 .356 .592 2.499
SE β1 1.149 .346 .494 2.739
Mean β2 1.175 .354 .566 2.382
SE β2 1.141 .351 .544 2.675
Turnover/Tenure Measures
Mean % Inc. Running 90.899 .189 90.184 91.660
Mean % Inc. Defeated 25.603 8.483 2.740 49.896
Mean Tenure 50.737 42.437 1.695 178.648
Var Tenure 23.143 23.428 1.310 185.353
Beta Fit Statistics
Mean Estimated α 1.988 .691 .712 9.931
Mean Estimated β 1.820 .629 .632 5.212
Mean Estimated φ 3.767 1.153 1.455 10.300
67
T
ab
le
4.
3:
P
ar
ti
al
-R
an
k
C
or
re
la
ti
on
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
b
y
K
ey
M
o
d
el
In
p
u
ts
&
O
u
tp
u
ts
M
ea
n
S
E
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
S
E
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
R
e-
E
le
ct
io
n
R
e-
E
le
ct
io
n
D
is
ci
p
li
n
ar
y
L
oy
al
ty
L
oy
al
ty
α
β
φ
In
p
u
t
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
In
te
n
si
ty
R
at
e
R
at
e
F
it
F
it
F
it
M
ea
n
D
em
.
P
os
it
io
n
.3
72
-.
57
9
-.
07
4
-.
25
8
-.
02
1
-.
06
9
.0
60
-.
01
5
(.
00
9)
(.
00
9)
(.
00
9)
(.
01
0)
.0
10
)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
1)
S
D
D
em
.
P
os
it
io
n
.4
36
-.
06
2
.2
24
.0
24
.0
19
-.
00
1
-.
02
7
-.
00
6
(.
00
8)
(.
01
2)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
0)
M
ea
n
R
ep
.
P
os
it
io
n
.8
23
-.
23
9
.4
95
.0
67
.0
67
-.
04
5
-.
08
2
-.
03
9
(.
00
4)
(.
01
0)
(.
00
8)
(.
00
9)
(.
00
8)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
1)
M
ea
n
D
em
.
P
os
it
io
n
-.
00
4
.0
09
.0
18
-.
00
8
-.
00
9
-.
01
0
-.
00
3
-.
01
0
(.
01
0)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
0)
(.
00
9)
(.
01
0)
()
.0
10
)
(.
00
9)
(.
01
1)
R
es
ou
rc
e
M
ax
.
.0
19
.0
13
.0
27
.5
15
.1
50
-.
00
3
-.
28
3
-.
09
7
(.
01
1)
(.
00
9)
(.
00
9)
(.
01
1)
(.
00
9)
(.
00
9)
(.
01
1)
(.
00
9)
M
ea
n
L
ea
d
er
P
ar
.
0
-.
00
3
.0
10
-.
95
5
-.
12
9
-.
03
2
.0
03
.0
62
.0
11
(.
01
1)
(.
01
0)
(.
00
1)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
0)
M
ea
n
L
ea
d
er
P
ar
.
1
.0
05
.0
03
.8
39
.0
47
.0
12
-.
00
9
-.
01
4
-.
00
3
(.
00
9)
(.
00
9)
(.
00
4)
(.
01
0)
(
.0
10
)
(.
01
0)
(.
00
9)
(.
00
9)
M
ea
n
L
ea
d
er
P
ar
.
2
.0
13
-.
00
8
.9
31
.0
82
.0
17
-.
00
1
-.
04
8
-.
01
8
(.
00
9)
(.
01
0)
(.
00
2)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
0)
(.
01
1)
(.
00
9)
(.
01
0)
68
Table 4.4: Partial-Rank Regression Coefficients for Key Model Outputs
Mean SD Mean Mean SD
Re-Election Re-Election Disciplinary Loyalty Loyalty
Input Probability Probability Intensity Rate Rate
Mean Dem. .025∗∗∗ −.075∗∗∗ −.003∗∗∗ −.027∗∗∗ −.002∗∗∗
Dist. Pref. (.001) (.0005) (.0003) (.0005) (.0002)
SD Dem. .060∗∗∗ −.018∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗ .005∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗
Dist. Pref. (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0004)
Mean Rep. .086∗∗∗ −.031∗∗∗ .020∗∗∗ .007∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗
Dist. Pref. (.001) (.0005) (.0003) (.0005) (.0002)
SD Rep. −.0003 −.001 .0003 −.0002 −.0001
Dist. Pref. (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0004)
Resource Max. .003∗∗ .001 .001∗∗ .113∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0004)
Mean Leader −.001 −.001 −.237∗∗∗ −.023∗∗∗ −.004∗∗∗
Parameter 0 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0004)
Mean Leader −.001 .002∗ .117∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
Parameter 1 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0004)
Mean Leader .002 −.001 .193∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
Parameter 2 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0004)
Constant .636∗∗∗ .214∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .428∗∗∗ .336∗∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.001)
Observations 9,900 7,336 9,900 8,923 7,412
Robust R2 .676 .736 .925 .811 .772
Reduction in 1375.4∗∗∗ 1361.7∗∗∗ 8088.8∗∗∗ 2545.2∗∗∗ 1668.8∗∗∗
Dispersion
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.5: Partial-Rank Regression Coefficients for Key Model Outputs (cont’d)
Mean Mean Mean
α β φ
Input Fit Fit Fit
Mean Dem. −.071∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ .058∗∗∗
Dist. Pref. (.005) (.006) (.011)
SD Dem. −.058∗∗∗ −.074∗∗∗ −.122∗∗∗
Dist. Pref. (.010) (.011) (.021)
Mean Rep. −.076∗∗∗ −.119∗∗∗ −.195∗∗∗
Dist. Pref. (.005) (.006) (.011)
SD Rep. −.015 .002 −.021
Dist. Pref. (.010) (.011) (.021)
Resource Max. −.008 −.829∗∗∗ −.824∗∗∗
(.010) (.011) (.022)
Mean Leader .034∗∗∗ .192∗∗∗ .225∗∗∗
Parameter 0 (.010) (.011) (.021)
Mean Leader −.015 −.091∗∗∗ −.095∗∗∗
Parameter 1 (.010) (.011) (.021)
Mean Leader −.007 −.124∗∗∗ −.125∗∗∗
Parameter 2 (.010) (.011) (.021)
Constant −.724∗∗∗ −.048 −.744∗∗∗
(.029) (.032) (.061)
Observations 7,801 7,654 6,060
Robust R2 .824 .718 .755
Reduction in 2423.6∗∗∗ 1298.7∗∗∗ 1247.4∗∗∗
Dispersion
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Mean Loyalty and Loyalty Dispersion as a Function of Electoral Security
(Partial Rank-Regression Coefficients)
Mean Mean
Loyalty Rate φ Fit
Mean Re- .244∗∗∗ −3.076∗∗∗
Election Prob. (.008) (.199)
SD Re- .142∗∗∗ −1.176∗∗∗
Election Prob. (.012) (.305)
Mean Dem. −.022∗∗∗ .057∗∗
Position (.001) (.026)
SD Dem. −.009∗∗∗ .022
Position (.001) (.027)
Mean Rep. −.011∗∗∗ .050∗∗
Position (.001) (.021)
SD Rep. −.0003 −.031
Position (.001) (.024)
Resource Max. .113∗∗∗ −.823∗∗∗
(.001) (.024)
Mean Leader −.023∗∗∗ .227∗∗∗
Parameter 0 (.001) (.024)
Mean Leader .011∗∗∗ −.111∗∗∗
Parameter 1 (.001) (.024)
Mean Leader .017∗∗∗ −.117∗∗∗
Parameter 2 (.001) (.024)
Constant .248∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗
(.007) (.167)
Robust R2 .828 .768
Reduction in Dispersion 1879.6∗∗∗ 874.1∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.7: Disciplinary Intensity as Function of Electoral Security, Partial-Rank Re-
gression Coefficients
Mean Disciplinary Intensity
(1) (2)
Mean Re- .334∗∗∗ .056∗∗∗
Election Prob. (.003) (.007)
SD Re- .148∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
Election Prob. (.004) (.009)
Mean Leader −.237∗∗∗ −.238∗∗∗
Parameter 0 (.0003) (.0003)
Mean Leader .118∗∗∗ .122∗∗∗
Parameter 1 (.0003) (.004)
Mean Leader .193∗∗∗ −.048∗∗∗
Parameter 2 (.0003) (.004)
Leader Parameter 1 −.004
* Mean Re-Election (.004)
Leaser Parameter 1 −.0004
* SD Re-Election (.006)
Leader Parameter 2 .284∗∗∗
* Mean Re-Election (.004)
Leader Parameter 2 .114∗∗∗
* SD Re-Election (.006)
Constant .226∗∗∗ .465∗∗∗
(.002) (.006)
Robust R2 .957 .967
Reduction in Dispersion 9764.9∗∗∗ 10267.3∗∗∗
∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Mean φ Fit as Function of Electoral Security and Party Discipline, Partial-
Rank Regression Coefficients
Mean φ Fit
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Re- −4.508 −14.764∗
Election Prob. (5.748) (7.760)
SD Re- −12.852 24.803∗∗
Election Prob. (9.612) (10.973)
Mean Discipline −14.047 −14.747∗ −57.685∗∗
(15.602) (8.255) (27.059)
Mean Discipline2 12.667 11.110 47.722∗∗
(13.948) (7.201) (24.172)
Mean Discipline * 12.903 45.161
Mean Re-Election Prob. (20.774) (28.154)
Mean Discipline2 * −12.555 −38.282
Mean Re-Election Prob. (18.465) (25.130)
Mean Discipline * 44.028 −81.203∗∗
SD Re-Election Prob. (34.215) (39.183)
Mean Discipline2 * −34.606 65.942∗
SD Re-Election Prob. (29.925) (34.400)
Constant 8.358∗ 8.114∗∗∗ 22.007∗∗∗
(4.290) (2.326) (7.453)
Robust R2 .814 .910 .921
Reduction in Dispersion 8721.1∗∗∗ 9489.8∗∗∗ 10097.∗∗∗8
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: all exogenous parameters included, but not reported.
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Figure 4.1: Examples of PDFs and CDFs for Beta(α, β)
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between Electoral Security and Party Loyalty
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Divergent Electoral Securities on Fitted Values of Mean φ
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Figure 4.4: Party Discipline as a Function of Mean & Variation in Electoral Security
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Figure 4.5: Modifying Effects of Leadership Characteristics on Relationship between
Electoral Security & Party Discipline
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Figure 4.6: Magnitude of Effect of Electoral Threat on φ Fit, as Modified by Party
Discipline
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Figure 4.7: Electoral Turnover as Function of Discipline and Electoral Threat (Blue
= Safest Quartile, Red = Least Safe Quartile )
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CHAPTER V
Characterizing Loyalty Distributions Across Party
Caucuses in the U.S. House
5.1 Introduction
The results from simulation experiments involving the computational model of
party discipline and electoral adaptation, as described in Chapter 3, provide a basis
for the systematic investigation of empirical trends in the connection between electoral
security and party loyalty in the U.S. House. Of particular interest is the finding that
cross-pressure of moderates is the key to explaining differential patterns of dispersion
in party loyalty scores. As stated in the modeling chapter, the intuition behind this
finding is threefold.
• Legislators must feel electoral threat from supporting the party line on roll-call
votes, in the form of reduced margins of re-election.
• The costs of supporting the party-line must be high enough to cause the leg-
islator to defect from the party line and forego the benefits associated with
supporting the party line.
• The legislator must survive in the electoral arena after having done so. This
may involve the cultivation of an alternative (and more moderate) legislative
80
reputation over the course of her career.
Empirical assessment of how the partisan context (e.g. the intensity of cross-
pressure, and the relative merits of supporting the party line, conditional on largely
unseen incentives to do so) affects legislator behavior is inherently difficult. In par-
ticular, evaluating the above intuitions will be tricky, as the third item involves a
dynamic component – referencing the legislator’s career and electoral survival. Legis-
lators who make choices that cause them to fail to secure re-election do not continue
to appear in the data set. The approach that will be taken in evaluating the veracity
of the conclusions drawn from the model will be to first investigate the nature of the
partisan and institutional context, by looking at distributions of party unity rates at
the party caucus level (e.g. at every party-Congress combination) and then by as-
sessing differential rates of adaptation for individual legislators both cross-sectionally
in different contexts, and over the course of their careers. This chapter will focus
on the former, characterizing rates of dispersion of party unity scores as a function
of preference heterogeneity within party caucuses, and Chapter 6 will proceed with
the individual-level analysis of legislator behavior. In particular, the analysis in this
chapter will be centered around the estimation of Beta regression models of party
unity that permit the simultaneous estimation of legislator adaptation and unity dis-
persion, while accommodating the natural skew and heteroskedasticity of values in
the data set.
5.2 Characterizing Hypotheses
The predictions generated by the computational model fall into two categories.
The first, related to an individual legislator’s propensity to respond to electoral threat,
is relatively trivial and implied in a straightforward manner by the specification of
the legislator’s reaction function. That is, legislators choose to side with the party
81
less often, all else equal, when their margins of re-election are lowered. The idea is
that support for the party’s agenda can be costly for legislators representing districts
with policy preferences that conflict with those enshrined in the party’s agenda. The
contribution of the model was to show that all else is not equal for legislators fac-
ing differing average levels of cross-pressure. As legislators are pressured more (less)
strongly into supporting a more (less) dangerous agenda, they initially respond by
defecting more (less) often from the party line on roll-call votes. However, a suffi-
ciently strong party discipline regime basically puts cross-pressured moderates in an
impossible position – regardless of their behavior, they are unable to survive in the
electoral arena when faced with a partisan and institutional context that gives them
no good options.
The mediating effect of partisan pressure and institutions in the model is mainly
assessed through a dispersion parameter, φ, which results from fitting observed party
unity rates to a Beta distribution. Thus, there is analytical separation between the
sensitivity of individual legislators’ responses to electoral threat, and what kinds of
dispersion are possible under the partisan legislative conditions the legislator faces.
While legislators should always be more likely to defect from the party line when
facing increased electoral peril from doing so, it is important to characterize the ex-
tent to which this is possible through the dispersion rate. What is needed, then, is a
way of estimating dispersion as an essential aspect in fitting variation in party unity
rates to variation in electoral security. The purpose of this chapter is to propose just
such a model, based on a beta regression framework, which allows for the simulta-
neous estimation of the relationship between electoral security and party unity and
the relationship between indicators of cross-pressure and dispersion implicit in the
generating distribution of unity scores.
Restating the above, there are two hypotheses under consideration in this chapter:
1. Party unity scores exhibited by individual legislators should be positively related
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to their previous margins of election/re-election.
2. The observed degree of dispersion in party unity scores should be related to
preference heterogeneity within the parties.
To investigate these hypotheses, data on legislator behavior and legislative election
returns are needed, as well as ancillary data on constituency preferences.
5.3 Data
The time period under study for this project begins with the first Congress elected
after the end of Reconstruction of the Southern United States following the Civil War,
in 1878 (this corresponds to the 46th Congress). The period ends with the most recent
completed Congress – this was the 112th Congress, which was elected in 2010, and
met from 2011 to 2013.
A number of data sources were utilized in the construction of the dataset for this
project. Return data on elections to the U.S. House comes from the Constituency-
Level Elections Archive (CLEA).1 For each electoral constituency included in the
CLEA data, the winner and highest-placing challenger (if any) were identified. The
re-election margin was the size of the difference between the top two finishers,2 divided
by the total votes garnered by the top two finishers – thus, it runs from a minimum
value of just above 0, to a maximum value of just under 1 (or 1, in the case of winners
who faced no challengers).3
1The data used were those from the December 2013 release. This release was missing a few
elections, which were included in the next release, but these omissions were independently detected
and included by the author. Auxiliary data sources for missing data and consistency checks include
Dubin’s (1998) guide to U.S Congressional Elections for elections prior to 1920, and the House clerk’s
official reports for data after 1920 (see references for link.)
2Candidates running under more than one party’s label (as in the case of modern-era fusion-
candidacies in New York or Connecticut, or early 20th-century fusion-candidacies in Pennsylvania
or California) had their votes under all labels tallied up, and were assigned a party membership
based upon the label under which they received the most votes.
3For technical purposes, this score was adjusted at the high end, so that any candidate winning
with a share of more than 99.9 percent of the vote was adjusted to winning with 99.9 percent of the
83
House roll-call data comes from Poole’s Voteview archives, which collect all roll-
call votes for each individual member of each Congress, along with other important
information about each individual Congressperson’s term (e.g. how they secured
office,4 and what party they affiliated with).5
Party unity scores for individual members meeting the criteria were calculated as
follows. First, all roll-call votes in each Congress were analyzed to determine which
votes featured a majority of Democrats voting on the opposite side of a majority of
Republicans. Second, on that subset of roll-call votes, individual members’ voting
records were analyzed to determine whether or not they voted in the same way as
a majority of their co-partisans. Thus, each individual roll-call vote choice on this
subset of votes can be understood as a “vote with one’s party” or a “vote against one’s
party.” A party unity score for legislator i in Congress t was calculated according to
the following formula:
unityit =
votes with party + 1
votes with party + votes against party + 2
(5.1)
The added constants to the numerator and denominator of the above expression
are a form of penalization suitable for dependent variables that run in a range from
0 to 1. They insure that the no values of the fraction will actually equal exactly 0 or
1. This is mainly an issue for individuals elected to earlier Congresses, where roll-call
votes were less frequent, especially those only serving partial terms before resignation,
illness or death.
Additional data were also collected for the purposes of trying to characterize pref-
erence heterogeneity within the Congressional parties. The first is simply a region
vote. The bias introduced by this adjustment is minimal, and is only assessed upon individuals that
were unchallenged, or whose nearest competitor was actually a compilation of “other” or “scattering”
votes.
4Ambiguous cases were cross-checked against available biographical resources, as needed – espe-
cially the biographical directory maintained by the House Clerk (location in references)
5Details on cases included in the data set are included in Appendix A.2.
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indicator for “Southern” legislators, where Southern is defined as the eleven states of
the former Confederacy. The second is a measure of population density by Congres-
sional district, intended to capture conflict between legislators represent rural and
urban districts, respectively. The sources for data on the area of Congressional dis-
tricts are GIS shapefiles for U.S. House districts, compiled by Lewis et al (2013).6
The third is Democratic presidential vote by Congressional district. The advantage
of this measure is that is speaks directly to the partisan predilections of the district,
in a way that does not involve evaluations of the legislator. The disadvantage of
this measure is that it is not generally available for a very broad period of time –
Jacobson’s (2010) data on presidential vote by Congressional district begin with the
1952 elections.7
5.3.1 Naive Analyses of Electoral Adaptation
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 contain OLS estimates for the nature of legislator adaptation to
electoral threat. In particular observed party unity scores for a legislator are regressed
on the natural log of re-election margin. Table 5.1 shows the results from the simplest
possible model – one without fixed effects for Congresses. Contrary to expectation, in
this simple model, margin of re-election is negatively and significantly associated with
party unity rate for both Republicans and the full sample of Democrats (Northern
Democrats, when split out, exhibit the expected positive relationship, while Southern
Democrats do not). Table 5.2 re-estimates this relationship with fixed-effects for each
Congress included, but the results remain the same.
Figure 5.1 helps somewhat to explain this puzzling result – it presents scatterplots
6The methods used for translating shapefile data into population density estimates is described
in more detail in Appendix A.2.
7As far as I can tell, publically available versions of these data only run through 2004. Scores
for elections from 2008 were supplemented with data from the Cook Political Report. Additionally,
these data have the disadvantage of not being available for Congressional elections in which new
districts were created, but no presidential election has yet been held – this applies to the 1962, 1982
and 2002 House elections. These years are omitted from the data.
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of re-election margin and party unity rates for Democratic and Republican legislators
for the entire data set. In each case, while there appears to be a mild positive
relationship between re-election margin and party unity for most values of re-election
margin, there also exist a set of legislators facing no opposition or paltry opposition in
seeking re-election, These legislators tend to exhibit a wide array of unity behaviors,
and as such generally mitigate against a finding of a positive relationship between
re-election margin and party unity. Because of this, they remain included in the data
set, so as to render the hypothesis tests more conservative.
More generally, there is another important takeaway from the scatterplot of Fig-
ure 5.1 – the relationship between re-election margin and party unity is clearly het-
eroskedastic. The institutional and partisan context of heteroskedasticity can be seen
in Figure 5.2. These tables plot p-values for White’s test for heteroskedasticity for
Democratic and Republican caucuses over time. Many of the caucuses show evi-
dence of heteroskedasticity in the relationship between electoral security and party
loyalty, while others do not. This variation in the realized incidence of heteroskedas-
ticity suggests that it is something worth modeling directly. Additionally, as a purely
mathematical phenomenon, it makes sense for marginal members to exhibit more
variance than secure ones, as secure members already cluster up near maximal unity
scores. Thus, the relationship between electoral security and party loyalty has both
the theoretical potential and the natural inclination toward displaying heteroskedas-
ticity. Because of the fact that this heteroskedasticity is not a nuisance, but a feature
of the actual processes in question at work, it makes sense to choose a method for
analysis that naturally reflects and accommodates heteroskedasticity.
Additionally and relatedly, it’s not clear what the implicit generating distribu-
tion of party unity scores should be, a priori. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, party
unity scores generally tend to cluster toward the high end of the possible range of
scores, with averages and medians in party unity scores across caucuses always well
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above .5, and generally above .75. Additionally, the typical assumption of normal-
ity in the distribution of party unity scores is particularly ill-suited for proportions,
like party unity, as the normal distribution is unbounded. Fits of the normal distri-
bution will, by necessity, place positive likelihood on the observation of party unity
outcomes that are impossible by construction, and these impossible outcomes will
likely be correlated with independent variables of interest (e.g. the likely outcome
will be to assign impossibly-high unities to relatively secure members). Typically, the
problem of bounds would be corrected by applying a logistic transform to the un-
derlying propensity toward unity, which would here be interpretable as a proportion,
rather than a probability. But, the logistic function is symmetric in its assignment of
likelihoods about .5, and this is also inappropriate.
5.3.2 The Beta Distribution
The probability distribution that will be used to model party loyalty rates is the
Beta distribution. This distribution has support on a bounded interval – in this case,
the unit interval [0, 1] – and is thus more suitable for modeling rates and percentages
than more familiar probability distributions with continuous support over unbounded
distributions, like the normal distribution. The Beta distribution is given by:
f(x;α, β) =
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
xα−1(1− x)β−1 (5.2)
with shape parameters α, β > 0. The first term of the equation (a fraction ex-
pressed in terms of a ratio of Gamma functions) is a normalization constant. While,
strictly speaking, α and β can take on any positive values, for our purposes, the only
values under consideration will be α > 1 and β > 1. These restrictions assure that
the Beta probability distribution function will be unimodal. Some examples of the
Beta distribution function were given previously in Figure 4.1.
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Alternative Parameterization The mean of the Beta distribution is given by:
µ = E[X] =
α
α + β
(5.3)
Following Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004), this implies that, with the addition of
a precision parameter, φ = α + β, the probability distribution function for the Beta
distribution can be rewritten in terms of µ and φ as follows:
f(x;α, β) =
Γ(φ)
Γ(µφ)Γ((1− µ)φ)x
µφ−1(1− x)(1−µ)φ−1 (5.4)
Carrying the parameter value restrictions forward, 0 < µ < 1 and φ > 2. The
values of µ are intuitive, as the mean of a set of percentages must lie between 0 and
1. The values of φ are somewhat less intuitive – they are a measure of dispersion, but
dispersion is greater at lower values of φ. One important property of this dispersion
parameter is that, unlike the standard deviation of a normal distribution, φ does not
restrict observations to expected symmetry about the mean. This lack of a restriction
is valuable, as the mean of party loyalty rates (both in the model, and in the data)
is generally much greater than 0.5, and the nature of the dispersion about the mean
is generally asymmetric.
5.3.3 Testing Beta vs. Normal Distributions
The Beta distribution does in fact provide a better fit to party unity distributions
than does the normal distribution. Figure 5.3 presents the results of Clarke’s (2007)
test for non-nested hypotheses, for each party-Congress combination.8 Figure 5.3
demonstrates that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal fit in favor of the Beta
8Clarke’s test uses as a null hypothesis the assumption that each hypothesis in question is an
equally-good fit to the data, as measured by the likelihood assigned to each data point, given the
estimated model parameters. In the models are equally-good, then each data point will be have a
higher likelihood under each fit with probability of one-half. Thus, for a data set of a given size,
the null hypothesis to test against is a binomial distribution with that many observations, and .5
probability.
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alternative in the vast majority of Democratic and Republican caucuses.
Interestingly, the exceptions to this rule, where the normal distribution provide a
better fit to observed distributions of unity scores than does the Beta distribution, are
informative. Specifically, in both the Democratic and Republican parties, the superior
fit of the Beta distribution is least well-supported in the period between about 1890
and 1920. This was a time in which parties were split by the ascendant political forces
of progressivism and populism (Gerring 2001, McCarty et al 2006.), in which the lines
of conflict largely broke down along regional lines (in the Democratic party) and rural-
urban lines (in the Republican party). This split is uniquely visible when applying
Clarke’s test to Northern Democratic legislators and Southern Democratic legislators.
In the period in question, Southern Democrats outnumbered Northern Democrats,
and the party’s agenda catered to the Southerners – as a result, Northern Democrats’
party loyalties were generally depressed toward the middle of the distribution, making
the normal distribution a (relatively) better fit. As the Democratic party’s power base
shifts northward over the course of the 20th century (Milikis 1993), it is Southerners
who are increasingly alienated by the party’s agenda, and lower their loyalties as a
result.
The fitted values for Beta distribution parameters for each Democratic and Re-
publican caucus, respectively, are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. In each case, the fit
is plotted onto a two-dimensional axis with each dimension representing a parameter
from the alternative parameterization (φ,µ) described above. Data points represent
a single caucus (e.g. a single party-Congress combination), and are color-coded by
historical era for context. Black points correspond to the period from the end of Re-
construction, through the era of Reed’s Rules, to the revolt against Speaker Cannon
in 1910. Blue points represent the period between 1910 and the Legislative Reorga-
nization Act of 1946. Green points represent the “Textbook Congress” from 1946 to
1972. Everything from the post-Watergate-reform Congress of 1974 to the present
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day is colored in red.
The progression of the values corresponds roughly to what we would expect from
a qualitative understanding of the evolution of partisan institutions and electoral
alignments in Congress. Pairs of values (φ, µ) are roughly dispersed along an arc.
Starting with a high-mean-discipline, low-dispersion era after Reconstruction and un-
til the revolt against Cannon, party unity rates steadily become more dispersed, and
lower on average. This is consistent with a hegemonic, regionally-divided Democratic
party that was home to a great deal of ideological diversity – Southern Democrats had
both the incentive, and especially during the Textbook Congress era, the institutional
capacity to resist voting with their party when cross-pressured. As the Northern, lib-
eral wing of the Democratic party ascends to preeminence within the party, especially
after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Democratic party becomes more dispersed – this
is consistent with the basic narrative coming out of the computational model from
Chapter 4, as Southern legislators depress their loyalty scores to insulate themselves
from the potential electoral dangers of being associated with the national Democratic
party’s increasingly liberal agenda. Eventually, after the pro-party reforms of the
post-Watergate era, Southern Democrats are no longer able to hold these seats, and
are replaced by conservative Republicans. Thus, the dispersion within the Democratic
party declines, and mean party discipline among the remaining members decreases.
On the Republican side, the data follow a somewhat similar pattern. The Republi-
cans start as a party divided between dominant conservative regulars in the Northeast
and a progressive/populist wing in the Midwest and West. After the New Deal, re-
maining Northeastern Republicans became more moderate, and Midwestern/Western
became more conservative, with the latter increasingly having a numerical advantage.
The dwindling of the now-liberal Northeastern wing of the party coincides with the
realignment of conservative Southern constituencies to the Republican party following
the Civil Rights era and the Great Society, resulting a more homogeneously conser-
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vative and disciplined Republican party.
5.4 Modeling Individual Behavior & Group-Level Disper-
sion: A Beta Regression Approach
The story presented in the previous section is far from rigorous – what is really
needed to characterize the partisan-institutional mediation of the connection between
electoral security and party unity is a way to actually link observable markers of
preference to dispersion and observable markers of electoral threat to mean loyalty.
Such a method is provided for the case of Beta-distributed dependent variables like
the one under study – the method of Beta regression (Vasconcellos and Cribari-Neto
2005, Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004.) In the Beta regression framework, it is possible
to simultaneously fit the value of the dispersion parameter generating observations
of a dependent variable that is Beta-distributed, and fit the marginal effect of an
independent variable on said dependent variable, given the dispersion.
More specifically, following Ferrari and Cribari-Neto’s (2004) notation, the model
is laid out as follows. For a set of dependent variable values yi ∼ B(µi, φ), the Beta
regression model can be expressed as:
g(µi) = ηi = x
T
i β (5.5)
Intuitively, this describes a set of equations in which a set of coefficients (β) is
estimated to produce raw predicted values, which are then filtered through a link
function g(), to produce final predicted values, denoted ηi. The link function can be
anything that takes values on the entire real line.9
As presented, the model assumes a constant dispersion φ across all observations –
in other words, a single predicted value of φ is fitted for all observations.. This assump-
9For the purpose of the present analysis, it will be a logit-link function.
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tion can be weakened to produce an extension, referred to as a variable-dispersion
model. In the variable-dispersion model, values of φi are estimated simultaneously,
with respect to each observation with values of µi. Thus, the twin equations to be
estimated can be expressed as:
g1(µi) = η1i = x
T
i β (5.6)
g2(φi) = η2i = z
T
i γ (5.7)
where β and γ are vectors of regression coefficients, xi and zi are sets of re-
gressors, and η1i and η2i are linear predictors of µi and φi, respectively. Since the
model is heteroskedastic, Pearson residuals are calculated and reported to assess the
significance of coefficient values. Estimates from both the constant-dispersion and
variable-dispersion models can be conveniently calculated using the betareg package
(Cribari-Neto and Zeilis 2009) available for R 3.1.
In terms of the hypotheses under consideration here, the xi’s are the electoral se-
curity10 enjoyed by individual legislators, as captured in both the linear and quadratic
expressions, which will be used to predict individual mean party unity levels. The zi’s
are the indicators of preference heterogeneity (region and population density) used to
predict dispersion. Results for each set of regressors will be reported as appropriate.
5.5 Results
The presentation of results proceeds as follows. First, to evaluate the first hy-
pothesis, a fixed-dispersion Beta regression model will be considered, followed by a
variable-dispersion model that only considers fixed effects by Congress for each party
grouping. After that, to test the second hypothesis (and provide additional tests for
10Technically, they are the natural log of the margin of re-election plus 1.
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the first), a full variable-dispersion Beta regression model will be introduced, in which
indicators of party preference heterogeneity are included as part of the model for the
dispersion parameter φ. Empirical analysis will conclude with some additional atten-
tion given to shifts in the values of estimated coefficients for the Beta regressions over
time, as well additional explorations into the behavior of Republican legislators.
5.5.1 Fixed Dispersion Models & Basic Variable-Dispersion Models
The first Beta regression estimate is the fixed dispersion model, as described in
the previous section. For each partisan grouping, the natural log of re-election mar-
gin is used as an independent variable for µ, and a constant value for φ is estimated.
Table 5.3 shows the results for these estimated equations. As the first row shows,
re-election margin has a strongly significant and positive effect on party unity rates
for Democratic legislators across the sample. For Republicans, however, there is a
negative effect of re-election margin on party unity, although it is not significant.
Partitioning the Democrats shows that Northern Democrats are driving the observed
positive effect – there is very strong evidence of a positive relationship between elec-
toral security and party loyalty for Northern Democrats, while Southern Democrats
show a smaller but significant negative effect of re-election margin on party loyalty.
Next, a simple variable-dispersion model is introduced, in which the only variables
used to model dispersion are fixed effects for each Congress – the idea being that
such a model could help control for strategic considerations introduced by factors
like majority party size (Lebo et al. 2007) The results of estimates for this model
are reported in Table 5.4. Unfortunately, the first hypothesis performs less well in
this specification. While Northern Democrats continue to show a strong positive
and significant effect of re-election margin on party unity, Southern Democrats still
show a negative and significant effect. Meanwhile, Republicans continue to exhibit
a negative relationship between re-election margin and party unity, and it is now
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strongly statistically significant.
5.5.2 Modeling Dispersion Directly
Tests of the second hypothesis begin with the introduction of measures of prefer-
ence heterogeneity to the variable-dispersion Beta regression model. At this point,
some clarifications should be made about the expected values of the coefficients. Re-
call that smaller values of φ represent more dispersion in party unity scores. As a
result:
1. The dummy variable for South should have a negative coefficient for Democrats,
and a positive one for Republicans. The reason for this is that Southern
Democrats elected to Congress more frequently occupied a cross-pressured po-
sition in the time period covered by aggregate data set than did non-Southern
Democrats, while the opposite is true for Republicans.11
2. The coefficient for population density should be positive for Democrats and
negative for Republicans, by similar reasoning as above.
3. Finally, the coefficient on Democratic presidential vote should be positive for
Democrats, and negative for Republicans.
Table 5.5 shows results for variable-dispersion Beta regressions over the entire
data set, with Congress-specific fixed effects, population density and a South dummy
included in the model for φ. The results are as expected for the South dummy variable
– the coefficient for Democrats is negative and strongly significant, and the coefficient
for Republicans is positively and strongly significant. The results are mixed for the
population density variable – Republicans show the expected negative coefficient on
density, and the effect is strongly significant. However, Democrats also have a negative
11The appropriateness of these claims about cross-pressure can change over time, which will be
addressed by the structural change analysis to follow.
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and a strongly significant coefficient on population density, contrary to expectations.
Some of this effect may be explained by regional differences in population density,
since both regional partitions of the Democratic data show positive estimates of the
effect of density on φ, though neither is statistically significant at any conventional
level. The results for the first hypothesis remain substantially unchanged from Table
5.4.
Table 5.6 reports the results for the same variable-dispersion Beta regression
model, but with the inclusion of Democratic presidential vote as an independent vari-
able explaining dispersion (so the data set starts after 1952). Interestingly, the test
of the hypothesis for Democratic presidential vote gets mixed results – Republicans
have the expected negative and significant coefficient, indicating that the presence of
more-strongly Democratic districts increases disperse in party unity rates. However,
Democrats exhibit the opposite relationship from that expected – Democratic presi-
dential vote has a negative and significant effect on φ, indicating that the presence of
more-strongly Democratic districts increases dispersion of Democratic party loyalty
scores. When split by region, Northern Democrats behave in line with expectations,
showing a positive and significant coefficient for Democratic presidential vote, while
an even larger negative effect is returned for Southern Democrats.
Also of note from Table 5.6 is how the estimated coefficients for some of the
variables from Table 5.5 change, due to the inclusion of Democratic presidential vote
and the restriction of the time period to more recent years. In particular, the effect
of re-election margin on party unity is now negative and significant for the pooled
Democratic sample, although it remains consistent with expectations (positive and
significant) for Northern Democrats. Republicans, on the other hand, now show the
expected relationship between electoral security and party loyalty, with a positive
and significant coefficient estimate for re-election margin. In addition, population
density now has the expected positive and significant effect on values of φ for Northern
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Democrats, while Southern Democrats still show a significant, negative effect.
5.5.3 Beta Regression Coefficients over Time: A Structural Change Ap-
proach
One possible reason for some of the surprising, mixed results from the above
analysis is that observations are being pooled from over vast period of time. In
particular, the relevance of some of the coefficients may change markedly over the
time period covered by the data set. While it’s not practical to exhaustively list
and test the expected fluctuations in coefficient values over the entire time period,
it would be worthwhile to be able to characterize general trends of change in these
coefficients, to see if they line up with our intuitions about partisan change in the
House over the time period.
To characterize how Beta regression coefficient estimates change over time, I take
an empirical M-fluctuations approach to structural change (Zeilis 2005, Zeilis et al
2010). This approach calculates a series of moving-averages for coefficient estimates
to try and determine whether or not there is substantial variance in the estimates
from one point in time to another. The null hypothesis under consideration in such an
approach is that there are no changes in the underlying model over time – fluctuations
outside of error bound indicate that the underlying values for the coefficient have, in
fact, changed in a significant way. Such results are best interpreted visually – plots
for these processes can be generated using the strucchange package in R 3.1 (Zeilis
et al 2001).
Figure 5.7 shows the results from Democrats and Figure 5.8 shows the results
from Republicans. The idea behind interpreting these results is that fluctuations
that go “out-of-bounds” (that is, outside the two red lines that sit on either side of
zero) indicate that a reliable shift in the underlying coefficients has occurred. In this
sense the red-lines can be thought of as confidence bounds that allow us to reject the
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null hypothesis of no change. The bounds depicted in the figure represent an effect
significant at α = .05.
In the case of Democrats, there are a few interesting findings. First, electoral
security appears to have an increasing effect on party loyalty rates from about 1900
to 1950, followed by the a decreasing effect from about 1960 to the present day. The
increasing trend may reflect the gradual regional diversification of the House Demo-
cratic caucus over that time period, as Democrats increasingly represented competi-
tive Northern urban and suburban districts. On the other hand, the later period of
decline corresponds to a period of growing dominance of urban areas by Democrats,
where general elections are often uncompetitive, and thus may not serve as crucial
signals of electoral threat for legislators. Over nearly the entire time period, the effect
of density on φ increases, indicating that the role of dense districts in reducing dis-
persion increased over time. Lastly, the coefficient for the effect of the South dummy
variable on φ actually shows a positive trend from 1920 to the 1960s, but shows a
significant negative trend the mid-1960s to the mid-200s. This likely reflects the once-
strong, and then increasingly marginal, position of Southern Democrats within the
House Democratic caucus.
In the case of Republicans, there are also few trends worth mentioning. The first is
that from the New Deal era until the present day, there has been a persistent negative
trend in the relationship between re-election margin and party unity for Republicans.
This coincides neatly with the gradual withdrawl of Republicans from competitive
urban and suburban districts in the Northeast where moderate Republicans once
flourished. Oddly, the effect of population density on φ actually increases throughout
much of the time period, indicating that density increasingly contributes to tighter
distributions of party unity rates. While this seems immediately counterintuitive
to the modern reader, it should be remembered that many rural Republicans from
the earlier parts of the era in question had very strongly Progressive and reformist
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tendencies that often put them odds with conservative Republicans (more will be said
on the shifting nature of these intra-party divides below). Lastly, the sudden positive
shift in the coefficient value for South from about the mid-1970s to the present day
indicates the dramatic nature of the effect of the secular, Southern realignment to
the Republican party – the influx of Southerners to the GOP coincided with a drastic
reduction in dispersion in party unity rates.
5.5.4 A Closer Look at Republicans
Before ending the analysis, it would be worthwhile to take a somewhat closer
look at the nature of the relationship between re-election margin and party unity for
Republicans over the time period. In particular, it would be valuable to see whether
partitioning the Republican sample, in a way that was standard for the Democratic
sample throughout this analysis might shed some light on why Republicans often
exhibit no relationship or a negative relationship between re-election margin and
party unity.
In the case of the Democrats, there is a perisistent and salient regional division that
conditions our expectations about the applicability of the theory. The Democratic
party in the South was a very different party from that of the North for much of
the time period in question, often running uncontested candidates who, once elected,
voted against their party quite frequently (at least in the 20th century). No such
division of that magnitude immediately springs to mind for Republicans, but there
is some evidence that different regional splits have played a role in explaining intra-
party division within the Republican party (Gerring 2001, Brewer and Stonecash
2008). Specifically, as Reiter and Stonecash (2010) point out, different regional splits
operated within the Republican party in the pre-New-Deal and post-New-Deal era. In
the former (up until 1938), conservative Northeasterners dominated the party, while
more moderate and Progressive agrarian wings hailed from the West and Midwest. In
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the latter (from about 1939 on), the remaining Northeast wing was greatly diminished
in numbers and became more liberal, and the balance of power within the party
shifted toward increasingly conservative Republicans in the Midwest and West (and
eventually, the South and Sun Belt.)
Table 5.7 conducts a variable-dispersion Beta regression analysis with a parti-
tioned Republican sample, the first column presents estimates for 1878-1938, and the
second column presents estimates for 1939-2012. Importantly, the Republican show
the same negative and signficant relationship between re-election margin and party
loyalty for the earlier time period, but not for the later time period. For 1939-2012,
Republicans actually show a positive estimated effect for the coefficient for re-election
margin on party unity, and while the effect is not significant at conventional levels,
it’s close to significance (p <.11). Tables 5.8 and 5.9 break out each era by region
– instead of the North/South dichotomy used for Democrats, a four-region parti-
tion scheme is used. As Table 5.8 shows, the observed negative effects on re-election
margin on party unity for Republicans from 1878-1938 is driven by Republicans out-
side the Northeast. These Republicans were often agrarian populists or Progressives
– such Republicans were frequently re-elected by very large margins, but were an
awkward fit in the conservative, Northeast-dominated Republican party of the time.
In this sense, they occupied a similar space in the Republican party that Southern
Democrats did in the Democratic Party. By contrast, the positive effect of re-election
margin on party unity rate for Republicans from 1939-2012 is driven by the entry of
Southern (and, to a lesser extent, Western) conservatives.
5.6 Discussion
As indicated in the previous section, each of the hypotheses received mixed sup-
port. The first hypothesis, which was of a positive and significant relationship between
re-election margin and party unity rate for individual House members, found solid
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support among Northern Democrats, but was decisively rejected among Southern
Democrats (who actually showed a negative and significant effect in almost all cases.)
The support for the first hypothesis among Republicans in the data set was spotty
and conditional at best, and significant negative effects of re-election margin were
found in some specifications.
In the case of the second hypothesis, results were again mixed. While the South
dummy variable had significant effects for each party (and the effects were in the
expected direction, with a negative effect on φ for Democrats and a positive effect on
φ for Republicans), the same was not true for population density or for Democratic
presidential vote. While population density and Democratic presidential vote had
the expected, significant effects for Republicans, neither had the expected effects for
Democrats, generally speaking.
It’s worth considering why these mixed results obtain – at least two potential
explanations come to mind. The first explanation is that the inclusion of legislators
who won uncontested elections may be skewing the results – ancillary analyses by the
author suggest that this is not the case.12
The second possibility reflects a somewhat deeper, theoretical issue. Namely,
the story of parties implicit in this dissertation assumes that the primary tension is
between marginal moderates and a core of secure, loyal partisans, which obscures
some familiar dynamics about intra-party factional conflict (diSalvo 2012). This
seems like a likely candidate, as factional splits do seem like intuitive explanations
for many of the ancillary findings discussed above (especially with regard to the
North/South split in the Democratic party, and the Northeast/non-Northeast split in
the Republican party). Relatedly, both the computational model of party discipline
12To be more specific, excluding the uncontested cases diminished the statistical significance of
some “wrong-signed” effects, but it never flips the sign to the expected direction. By contrast,
significant results in support of the hypotheses all survive and are generally strengthened – again,
note that the inclusion of uncontested legislators was intended to make the tests of the hypotheses
more conservative in nature.
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in play, and the empirical specifications above, implicitly assume unidimensionality
in the relevant policy space. The factional conflicts in question can be understood to
be contested over dimensions that are secondary to the primary economic dimensions
that explain roll-call votes in the U.S. House (i.e. racial issues in the Democratic
party, and monetary/rural-urban issues in the Republican party, see McCarty et al
2008). More will be said on these considerations in the conclusion to the project, but
these definitely seem like fruitful ideas for future research.
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Tables & Figures
Table 5.1: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity Rates
Party Unity Rate
All Northern Southern
Democrats Democrats Democrats Republicans
Ln(Margin) −.004∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ −.009∗∗∗ −.008∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.001)
Constant .832∗∗∗ .791∗∗∗ .807∗∗∗ .866∗∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.010) (.003)
Observations 14,542 9,041 5,501 12,340
R2 .001 .035 .001 .003
Adjusted R2 .001 .035 .001 .003
Residual Std. Error .151 .117 .185 .124
F Statistic 10.229∗∗∗ 329.324∗∗∗ 8.257∗∗∗ 34.194∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.2: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity Rates,
with Congress-Specific Fixed Effects (Not Reported)
Party Unity Rate
All Northern Southern
Democrats Democrats Democrats Republicans
Ln(Margin) −.002∗ .010∗∗∗ −.0003 −.004∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001)
Constant .862∗∗∗ .810∗∗∗ .890∗∗∗ .916∗∗∗
(.012) (.012) (.018) (.010)
Observations 14,542 9,041 5,501 12,340
R2 .151 .271 .515 .233
Adjusted R2 .147 .266 .509 .229
Residual Std. Error .140 .102 .129 .109
F Statistic 38.425∗∗∗ 49.908∗∗∗ 86.008∗∗∗ 55.609∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.3: Beta Regression Results for Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity
Rate, Constant φ
Party Unity Rate
All Northern Southern
Democrats Democrats Democrats Republicans
Mean
Ln(Margin) .029∗∗∗ .201∗∗∗ -.043∗∗∗ -.013
(.007) (.008) (.015) (.008)
Constant 1.409∗∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ 1.349∗∗∗ 1.724∗∗∗
(.020) (.021) (.050) (.020)
Precision (φ)
Constant 6.678∗∗∗ 9.730∗∗∗ 5.092∗∗∗ 9.458∗∗∗
(.077) (.145) (.094) (.121)
Observations 14,542 9,041 5,501 12,340
R2 .001 .067 .002 .0002
Log Likelihood 10781.3 8733.0 2,910.7 11,605.3
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.4: Beta Regression Results for Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity
Rate, Congress-Specific Fixed Effects on φ (not reported)
Party Unity Rate
All Northern Southern
Democrats Democrats Democrats Republicans
Mean
Ln(Margin) .044∗∗∗ .139∗∗∗ -.036∗∗∗ -.033∗∗∗
(.006) (.007) (.013) (.007)
Constant 1.377∗∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.789∗∗∗
(.017) (.020) (.043) (.018)
Precision (φ)
Constant 2.547∗∗∗ 2.668∗∗∗ 2.571∗∗∗ 2.699∗∗∗
(.112) (.153) (.167) (.116)
Observations 14,542 9,041 5,501 12,340
R2 .001 .067 .002 .0002
Log Likelihood 12028.0 9263.5 3611.0 12,216.1S
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.5: Beta Regression Results for Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity
Rate, Congress-Specific Fixed Effects and Model for φ )
Party Unity Rate
All Northern Southern
Democrats Democrats Democrats Republicans
Mean
Ln(Margin) .029∗∗∗ .141∗∗∗ -.036∗∗∗ −.033∗∗∗
(.006) (.008) (.013) (.007)
Constant 1.430∗∗∗ 1.312∗∗∗ 1.607∗∗∗ 1.791∗∗∗
(.017) (.020) (.043) (.018)
Precision (φ)
Ln(Density) -.025∗∗∗ .002 .028 -.051∗∗∗
(.005) (.005) (.018) (.006)
South -.405∗∗∗ .141∗∗∗
(.025) (.040)
Constant 2.834∗∗∗ 2.656∗∗∗ 2.495∗∗∗ 2.927∗∗∗
(.115) (.155) (.175) (.119)
Observations 14,542 9,041 5,501 12,340
R2 .001 .067 .002 .0002
Log Likelihood 12151.6 9263.6 3612.2 12256.8
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.6: Beta Regression Results for Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity
Rate, Model for φ with District Presidentiall Vote (1953-2012)
Party Unity Rate
All Northern Southern
Democrats Democrats Democrats Republicans
Mean
Ln(Margin) -.030∗∗ .223∗∗∗ -.023 .055∗∗∗
(.012) (.013) (.022) (.014)
Constant 1.601∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ .772∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(.034) (.035) (.074) (.035)
Precision (φ)
Pres. Vote -.579∗∗∗ .532∗∗ -.689∗∗ -.763∗∗
(.150) (.205) (.266) (.266)
Ln(Density) -.004 .080∗∗∗ -.142∗∗∗ -.080∗∗∗
(.008) (.009) (.023) (.011)
South -.734∗∗∗ .051
(.036) (.046)
Constant 3.323∗∗∗ 2.254∗∗∗ 3.496∗∗∗ 3.531∗∗∗
(.120) (.156) (.200) (.140)
Observations 14,542 9,041 5,501 12,340
R2 .001 .059 .005 .005
Log Likelihood 4800.4 5239.7 691.2 4211.9
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.7: Beta Regression Results for Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity
Rate, Congress-Specific Fixed Effects and Model for φ, Republicans Only
Party Unity Rate
1878-1938 1939-2012
Mean
Ln(Margin) -.045∗∗∗ .018
(.010) (.011)
Constant 1.965∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗
(.023) (.029)
Precision (φ)
Ln(Density) .012 -.050∗∗∗
(.009) (.009)
Northeast .100∗∗ -.414∗∗∗
(.041) (.041)
South .209∗∗∗ .012
(.071) (.045)
West .120 .002
(.070) (.046)
Constant 2.927∗∗∗ 2.837∗∗∗
(.125) (.110)
Observations 5315 6834
R2 .004 .003
Log Likelihood 6386.0 5951.3
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.8: Beta Regression Results for Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity
Rate, Congress-Specific Fixed Effects and Model for φ, Republicans Only,
By Region (1878-1938)
Party Unity Rate
Northeast Midwest South West
Mean
Ln(Margin) .001 -.112∗∗∗ -.076∗∗∗ -.095∗∗∗
(.015) (.015) (.028) (.027)
Constant 2.211∗∗∗ 1.985∗∗∗ 1.744∗∗∗ 3.268∗∗∗
(.036) (.035) (.057) (.066)
Precision (φ)
Ln(Density) -.061∗∗∗ .030 .035∗∗∗ -.070∗∗∗
(.014) (.018) (.043) (.027)
Constant 4.125∗∗∗ 2.677∗∗∗ 2.783∗∗∗ 3.268∗∗∗
(.180) (.193) (.787) (.606)
Observations 2191 2315 409 437
R2 .0001 .040 .013 .017
Log Likelihood 3347.6 2481.5 478.8 516.8
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.9: Beta Regression Results for Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity
Rate, Congress-Specific Fixed Effects and Model for φ, Republicans Only,
By Region (1939-2012)
Party Unity Rate
Northeast Midwest South West
Mean
Ln(Margin) -.007 -.058∗∗∗ .054∗∗∗ .038
(.023) (.020) (.004) (.025)
Constant 1.188∗∗∗ 1.767∗∗∗ 1.988∗∗∗ 1.688∗∗∗
(.057) (.049) (.051) (.063)
Precision (φ)
Ln(Density) -.038∗∗ .014 -.031 -.088∗∗∗
(.018) (.019) (.026) (.016)
Constant 1.945∗∗∗ 2.335∗∗∗ 3.839∗∗∗ 2.829∗∗∗
(.183) (.169) (.619) (.366)
Observations 1836 2365 1549 1238
R2 .0006 .002 .016 .006
Log Likelihood 1005.6 2300.3 2168.0 1321.9
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 5.1: Scatterplots of Re-Election Margin and Party Unity
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Figure 5.2: P-Values for White’s Test or Heteroskedasticity, Effect of Re-Election
Margin on Party Unity Rate
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Figure 5.3: P-Values for Clark’s Test of Non-Nested Models – Rejecting Null Hypoth-
esis of Equal Fit between Beta and Normal Distributions, in Favor of the
Beta
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Figure 5.4: P-Values for Clark’s Test of Non-Nested Models – Rejecting Null Hypoth-
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CHAPTER VI
The Survival of Cross-Pressured Moderates
In Chapter 4, results from the computational model of party discipline, legislator
behavior and electoral feedback were used to generate intuitions about the mediating
effect of party-constituency cross-pressure, and the observed degree of responsiveness
to electoral signals by cross-pressured moderates. However, as was mentioned at the
end of Chapter 4, to fully assess the nature of the relationship between cross-pressure
intensity and moderate behavior, some attention needs to be paid to the dynamic
aspects of the model. Specifically, in the results from the modeling project, the
lower degree of defections observed among cross-pressured moderates at high levels of
party discipline (thus producing the curvilinear relationship) was driven by rates of
moderate defeats in subsequent elections. Regardless of the behavioral predilections
of the moderate legislator, in the kind of the environment that produces strong party-
constituency cross-pressure, it’s difficult for moderate legislators to survive.
At the “micro” level, this finding makes intuitive sense – moderates may choose
to affiliate strongly with a party because of signal that it sends about their future
behavior to risk-averse electorate. Like all legislators, moderates begin as unknown
quantities, and have an incentive to support the party more than they otherwise might
as a result. When the electoral costs for affiliating with a party become strong enough,
moderates may have an incentive to develop an alternative ideological reputation,
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but this is not easily accomplished in short order, but only over the course of a
career. Strong cross-pressure cuts those kinds of careers short before they can begin.
The differential ability to properly develop a moderate partisan reputation should be
mediated by the broader partisan context in which the legislator makes her decisions.
The purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look at individual responses to
differential levels of electoral security with differing levels of party support on roll-call
votes. Specifically, strong attention will be paid to the conditioning effects of cross-
pressure and tenure on the connection between electoral security and party unity
rates, and on the connection between party unity and subsequent electoral success or
defeat.
6.1 Characterizing Hypotheses
From the above intuitive story, I derive two concrete hypotheses about the behav-
ior of representatives in the U.S. House, with regard to the nature of the relationship
between a representative’s electoral security and their subsequent party support rates
on roll-call votes. They are as follows:
1. The effect of a representative’s re-election margin on her party unity scores
should be conditional upon district preference, with legislators representing
more competitive (or hostile) districts showing more sensitivity to re-election
margin than those representing safe or favorable districts for a member of that
party.
2. The effect of a representative’s re-election margin on her party unity scores
should be conditional upon legislator tenure, decreasing as legislators’ careers
progress.
These hypotheses follow directly from the micro-level factors that help to produce
observed macro-level patterns in the computational model. Observed variation in
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party unity rates are mostly driven by moderates who are cross-pressured between
party and constituency. A heightened degree of cross-pressure should intensify the
incentive for moderates to defect from the party line, and moderates differ in the
degree to which they feel cross-pressured (both between representatives in a given
Congress and across a representative’s career within a Congress). Thus, the degree of
cross-pressure, as measured in terms of district preferences should have an amplifying
effect on the role of re-election margin in determining subsequent behavior by the
representative. That is, a representative would be more likely to utilize defection as
an insulation strategy in a district that is less in line their party’s preferences to begin
with. Tenure should matter too, as longer-tenured legislators should have stronger
individual ideological reputations, lessening the need to calibrate their association
with the party in response to electoral signals.
In addition, I derive two concrete hypotheses about the probability of subsequent
defeat of incumbent legislators, with regard to a representative’s party unity behavior
in a given Congress.
3. The effect of a representative’s party unity scores on the probability of her sub-
sequent electoral defeat should be conditional upon district preference, with
defeat probabilities for legislators representing more competitive (or hostile)
districts showing more sensitivity to party unity rates than do defeat probabil-
ities for legislators representing safe or favorable districts for a member of that
party.
4. The effect of a representative’s party unity scores on the probability of her sub-
sequent electoral defeat should be conditional upon legislator tenure, decreasing
as legislators’ careers progress.
Having investigated model predictions about legislator behavior in the shadow
of party-constituency cross-pressure, the investigation of these hypotheses serves to
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“close the loop” by substantiating the importance of dynamic feedback in producing
observed rates of party unity. Specifically, the insulation strategy of party defections
should be most effective in staving off electoral defeat for a representative when cross-
pressure is weaker, and when the representative has accumulated a longer tenure in
the chamber.
6.2 Data
6.2.1 Data Sources
Since the analysis in this chapter is focused on the same legislative body, and
over the same time period, as that in Chapter 4, many of the data sources from
Chapter 4 are used again. These are: party unity rate, margins of victory for House
members, district population density, the South dummy variable, and Democratic
presidential vote within the representative’s district. As before, the first four variables
are available for the entire time period from the 46th Congress (elected in 1878) to
the 112th Congress (elected in 2010) and Democratic presidential vote is available
from 1952-on. Analyses will be conducted over the entire data set using the density
and region variables as proxy for district preference, and over the reduced data set
using the presidential vote data as a proxy for district preferences. Tenure is also
introduced into the data set – this is just the number of terms already served by a
individual representative by that time.
In addition to tenure, another new variable is introduced into the analysis in
this chapter – subsequent re-election attempts, and success/defeat, of incumbent
legislators. Incumbency status is not available in the main electoral sources for the
project – though ICPSR ID codes and office occupancy data in the Voteview data
do permit the automatic identification of successfully re-elected legislators. Data on
incumbency status of candidates in House elections is provided by King (1992) and
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updated using Roll Call Magazine’s “Casualty Lists” (specifically, the category for
House members defeated in general elections) for defeated incumbents in more recent
Congresses. These sources can thus be used to identify incumbent legislators who
sought re-election, but were defeated. Together, this information is used to produce
two variables for each representative-Congress entry:
• Did the legislator seek re-election, contesting a general election as a result?
• Did the legislator secure re-election?
Analysis of legislator re-election is then conditioned upon a legislator running in a
general election for the U.S. House. This means that analyses seeking to explain prob-
abilities of incumbent defeat omit both incumbents who did not seek re-election, and
incumbents who did seek re-election but were not granted their party’s nomination
for the general election contest.
6.2.2 Exploratory Statistics on Party Unity, District Preference and Tenure
Before beginning with analysis, it would be worthwhile to consider some of the
basic relationships between the key independent variables in the study. The top
row in Figure 6.1 shows scatterplots for the natural log of population density and
re-election margin for each major party. Population density and electoral outcomes
don’t show much of a correlation upon immediate inspection – this probably reflects
the differing bases of power within the Democratic party throughout the time period
covered in the sample (i.e. the transition from being a party based in rural, Southern
districts to one based in urban, Northern districts). There does, on the other hand,
appear to be a mild negative relationship between density and re-election margin
for Republicans – this is also intuitive, as many of the less-loyal Republican House
members have tended to come from the suburban/urban, liberal-to-moderate wing of
the party from the mid-20th-century.
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In a similar fashion, the relationship between party unity rates and population
density comports with intuitions about variation in the composition of the major
parties over the time period under study, as seen in the bottom row of Figure 6.1.
Here, we can see strong variation in party loyalty rates (with even a component voting
with the party less often than not) in less dense districts, with more consistently loyal
behavior from those representing more densely-populated districts. Again, this could
reflect the once-central, and then marginal, role of conservative Southern Democrats
representing more rural districts. Interestingly, the plot for Republicans seems some-
what similar, in that there appears to be more variation in party unity scores in less
densely populated districts than in more populous districts.
Figure 6.2 repeats the plots in Figure 6.1, but with a representative’s tenure in
the House on the x-axis, instead of district population density. These plots are some-
what difficult to read, in that tenure takes on discrete values that can condense the
points being displayed, but there a still a few general takeaways from the informa-
tion presented in them. First, for both Democrats and Republicans, there appears to
be a mild negative relationship legislator tenure and re-election margins. This runs
counter to the idea that incumbents go up a gradient of increasing electoral security
as they progress in their careers. This apparent finding is especially interesting, con-
sidering that tenure tends to be associated with consistently higher levels of party
unity, which is consistent with findings by Theriault (2005) on career-cycle effects
upon party unity rates. Together, though, they do suggest an image of long-tenured
legislators as being not especially sensitive to the constituency signals that shifts in
re-election margin may reflect.
Figure 6.3 once again replicates the basic structure of the above plots, but with
presidential vote by Congressional district as the variable on the x-axis. As with the
previous two sets of figures, it’s difficult to derive much insight from these plots, but
a mild positive relationship appears to be on display for Democratic presidential vote
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by district and Congressional re-election margin for Democrats, and a mild negative
one on display for Republicans. Once again, the variance in these relationships is
interesting – much of the effect in each case seems to be driven by consistently high
re-election margins in the most partisan districts, while districts that are more com-
petitive at the presidential level see much more variance in party unity rates for both
Democratic and Republican members. This makes some sense, recalling that at least
part of the purpose of partisan legislative institutions is to help induce high rates
of unity from legislators who might otherwise fear the electoral consequences from
voting with the party more frequently. The variance in this behavior does suggest
that the electoral accountability present in diminishing rates of unity for less partisan
constituencies is not completely disrupted by partisan organization of electoral and
legislative endeavors.
6.2.3 Estimation Strategy for Legislative Panel Data
Estimating an individual-level model of electoral security and party loyalty re-
quires accounting for the fact that representatives serve in multiple Congresses (usu-
ally in sequence, but not always), and that the Congresses that they serve in are a
relatively small share of all possible Congresses.1 This implies that an unbalanced
panel approach to the data is appropriate. A panel model with fixed effects for legis-
lators is chosen – as noted by Carson et al (2010), the substitution of random effects
by House representative for fixed-effects generally has little effect on the results.2 The
panel structure is also utilized for modeling the effect of party loyalty on subsequent
electoral defeats for incumbents seeking re-election – the only modification is the
inclusion of the logit link function for estimation of the binary dependent variable.3
1Even John Dingell, current House Dean and longest-ever-tenured House member, has served in
only 28 of the 67 Congresses under study here.
2My own exploratory work with the data generally confirms this for the analysis presented here.
3Analysis is conducted in R 3.1, with the plm package used for estimation of equations with
party loyalty as the dependent variable, and the MASS package used for estimation of equations
with probability of incumbent defeat as the dependent variable.
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6.3 Results
Before beginning with the discussion of the results, it would once again to be
worthwhile to discuss the expected direction of the effects under investigation.
1. For Democrats, the conditioning effect of population density on the relation-
ship between electoral security and party loyalty should be negative, and for
Republicans it should be positive.
2. The conditioning effect of the South dummy on the relationship between elec-
toral security and party loyalty should be positive for Democrats, and negative
for Republicans.
3. Finally, the conditioning effects of Democratic presidential vote on the rela-
tionship between electoral security and party loyalty should be negative for
Democrats and positive for Republicans.
Each of these directional expectations also holds for the conditioning effects of
these contextual variables on the relationship between party loyalty and the proba-
bility of incumbent defeat. Additionally, the conditioning effects of legislator tenure
on both the relationship between electoral security and party unity, as well as on the
relationship between party unity and the probability of incumbent defeat, should all
be negative for both parties.
6.3.1 Conditioning Effects on the Relationship between Electoral Secu-
rity & Party Loyalty
Table 6.1 presents the results of linear panel model equations estimating the effect
of re-election on party unity rates for Democrats. Equations 2 and 4 are of primary
interest here, as they present the full interactive specification of the models, with
region and density standing in for cross-pressure, and with Democratic presidential
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vote standing in for cross-pressure, respectively. The coefficients for the interactive
terms test the hypotheses about conditioning effects – and the results are mixed. The
coefficient on the interaction term between the South dummy and re-election is posi-
tive and significant, as expected. However, the coefficient on the interaction between
density and re-election margin is negative and significant, the opposite of the ex-
pected direction. Additionally, the coefficient on the interaction between Democratic
presidential vote is positive (though not significantly so), which also runs counter to
expectations. Tenure, however, works as expected – its conditioning effect on the re-
lationship between re-election margin and party unity rate is negative and significant,
indicating that longer-tenured representatives exhibit less responsiveness to shifts in
re-election margin than do shorter-tenured members.
The first row of Figure 6.4 plots marginal effects for the relationship between re-
election margin and party unity, conditioned on each of these interactions (except
for the South dummy). As can be seen, the marginal effect of re-election margin on
party unity rate is significantly negative for most values of tenure, and is significantly
positive for most values of population density.
Table 6.2 replicates the above analysis for Republicans. With the exception of
the expected positive and significant coefficient on population density, no other hy-
potheses related to conditioning effects upon the relationship are supported by the
data. The coefficient on the interaction between Democratic presidential vote and
re-election margin has the correct sign, but is not significant at any conventional
levels. The remaining coefficients on interactive terms are statistically insignificant,
but are in the opposite direction from expectation. Marginal effects for Republicans
are plotted in the second row of Figure 6.2 – no additional insights are forthcoming,
though.
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6.3.2 Conditioning Effects on the Relationship between Party Loyalty &
Electoral Defeat
The second set of hypotheses – relating to the conditioning effects of cross-pressure
and tenure on the relationship between a representative’s party unity score and their
subsequent probability of defeat – are investigated in Table 6.3. The first two columns
show models estimated for Democratic representatives seeking re-election, and the sec-
ond two columns show models estimated for Republicans seeking re-election. Again,
of particular interest in each case are the coefficients on interaction terms in each
equation. Once again, the results are mixed. The interaction between party unity
rate and population density has the opposite-signed coefficients from that expected
for each party, and the effect for Democrats is significant. The coefficient on the in-
teraction term for South and party unity rate has the correct sign for each party, but
neither effect is statistically significant. While Republicans show the expected positive
and significant coefficient on the interaction between district Democratic presidential
vote and party unity, Democrats also show a positive and significant coefficient, which
runs counter to expectation. Finally, the hypothesis of a negative interactive effect
of tenure on the relationship between an incumbent legislator’s party unity rate and
their subsequent defeat probability was rejected across the board – the coefficients
for these interactive effects are all positive (though none are significantly so).
Marginal effects for party unity rate on probability of incumbent defeat (condi-
tioned on population density, tenure and Democratic presidential votes) are plotted
in Figure 6.5, with Democrats once again on the top row and Republicans on the
bottom. Predictably, for both parties, the marginal effect of party unity rate on the
probability of legislator defeat is only consistently positive across differing rates of
Democratic presidential vote within the incumbent’s district.
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6.4 Discussion
As was the case in Chapter 4, results for the hypotheses under consideration were
mixed. In the case of the first hypothesis, there existed some evidence that inten-
sity of cross-pressure could affect legislator responsiveness to electoral security – in
particular, in Southern Democrats being more responsive to shifts in re-election mar-
gin than their Northern counterparts. The second hypothesis, predicting a negative
interactive effect for tenure on the relationship between electoral security and party
unity, was strongly supported for Democrats, but not for Republicans.
The third hypothesis, predicting conditioning effects of cross-pressure on the re-
lationship between a representative’s party unity rate and their subsequent defeat
probability was completed rejected for Democrats, and only partially supported for
Republicans, who showed the expected conditioning effect of Democratic presidential
vote on the relationship between party unity rate and incumbent defeat probabil-
ity. Finally, the fourth hypothesis, predicting a negative effect of legislator tenure on
the strength of the relationship between party unity rate and subsequent incumbent
defeat probability, was rejected across the board.
Although these results are mixed, they are somewhat disappointing, with the no-
table exception of the negative effect of tenure on legislative responsiveness. This
finding does suggest that longer-tenured representatives may have less need for re-
sponsiveness to shifts in re-election margin than do their shorter-tenured colleagues.
While the present study can’t confirm the conjectured mechanism for this from the
computational model – namely, that longer-tenured moderates are more secure, since
they have developed consistent reputations for moderation and their defections don’t
induce uncertainty about their preferences – this finding is consistent with such an
explanation.
Many considerations may help to explain the mixed results found in the above
analysis. One important consideration at play in investigating what electorally-
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endangered moderates may do to protect themselves is that those who are unsuc-
cessful in doing so are removed from the data set. Explaining defeat probabilities
helps to get at some of the selection issues that this may raise, but integrating this
insight more broadly, for the refinement of hypotheses about legislator behavior and
electoral accountability, is inherently difficult. Additionally, as mentioned in the dis-
cussion of the results in Chapter 5, the model from which the predictions are derived
is inherently simplistic, and potentially omits other systematic factors that may help
to explain observed patterns in legislator responsiveness to electoral threat, and in
subsequent patterns in electoral accountability.4 These factors may, themselves be
related to quantities included in the model, and could be working at cross-purposes
with the mechanisms under study. Finally, the data set cover a long time period,
and many of the proposed relationships, especially with regard to factors that cause
cross-pressure, may be incompletely summarized or oversimplified in the formulation
of the hypotheses in question.
4One such mechanism could be the practice of partisan gerrymandering of House districts.
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Tables & Figures
Table 6.1: Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity Rates, Democratic House
Members, 1878-2010 (with Fixed Effects for Individual Legislators)
Dependent variable:
Party Unity Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Margin) .010∗∗∗ .003 .005∗∗∗ .005
(.001) (.004) (.002) (.007)
Ln(Density) .001 −.005∗
(.002) (.003)
Dem. Pres. Vote .276∗∗∗ .222∗∗∗
in District (.016) (.045)
Tenure −.001 .007∗∗∗ −.004 .003
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.005)
Ln(Margin) * .002∗∗∗
* Ln(Density) (.001)
Ln(Margin) * .009∗∗∗
South (.003)
Ln(Margin) * .017
Pres. Vote (.013)
Ln(Margin) * −.002∗∗∗ −.002∗∗∗
Tenure (.0003) (.0004)
Observations 11,942 11,942 5,640 5,640
Individuals 2655 2655 1129 1129
R2 .247 .253 .321 .326
Adjusted R2 .190 .195 .255 .259
F Statistic 44.376∗∗∗ 43.851∗∗∗ 75.836∗∗∗ 72.367∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Constant and South drop out due to legislator fixed-effects.
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Table 6.2: Effect of Re-Election Margin on Party Unity Rates, Republican House
Members, 1878-2010 (with Fixed Effects for Individual Legislators)
Dependent variable:
Party Unity Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Margin) −.001 −.009∗∗∗ −.004∗∗ −.013∗
(.001) (.003) (.002) (.007)
Ln(Density) −.002 −.005∗
(.002) (.003)
Dem. Pres. Vote −.146∗∗∗ −.197∗∗∗
in District (.024) (.045)
Tenure −.003 −.004∗ .001 .0004
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.004)
Ln(Margin) * .001∗∗
Ln(Density) (.001)
Ln(Margin) * .0001
South (.003)
Ln(Margin) * .020
Pres. Vote. (.015)
Ln(Margin) * .0003 .0001
Tenure (.0003) (.0004)
Observations 10,004 10,004 4,213 4,213
Individuals 2433 2433 1000 1000
R2 .256 .257 .294 .295
Adjusted R2 .192 .193 .223 .223
F Statistic 37.483∗∗∗ 36.044∗∗∗ 47.444∗∗∗ 44.344∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Constant and South drop out due to legislator fixed-effects.
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Table 6.3: Effect of Party Unity Rate on Probability Incumbent Defeat
Dependent variable:
Prob. of Incumbent Defeat
Democrats Republicans
Party Unity Rate .459 8.289∗∗∗ .836 12.647∗∗∗
(.984) (2.170) (1.115) (2.611)
Tenure -.152 .250∗ .457∗∗∗ .660∗∗∗
(.100) (.148) (.077) (.139)
Ln(Density) .125 .174
(.117) (.150)
Presidential Vote 6.880∗∗∗ -35.508∗∗∗
(3.489) (5.740)
Party Unity Rate .012 .153 .034 .253
* Tenure (.119) (.171) (.090) (.171)
Party Unity Rate -.307∗∗ .084
* Ln(Density) (.141) (.172)
Party Unity Rate -.390 1.340
* South (.811) (1.850)
Party Unity Rate 13.488∗∗∗ 32.623∗∗∗
* Pres. Vote (4.094) (6.927)
Observations 11942 5640 10004 4213
Groups 2655 1129 2433 1000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Constant and South drop out due to legislator fixed-effects.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation project was to motivate, develop and test the pre-
dictions from a dynamic model of party discipline, legislator vote choice and electoral
response. Having done this in the preceding chapters, it would be worthwhile to step
back from the details, and summarize the implications of the findings for future work
on legislator behavior in particular, and on mechanisms of democratic accountability,
in general.
I begin this chapter by summarizing the main contributions and findings of the
research from the previous chapters, focusing both on the theoretical and empirical
contributions of the project. I follow this discussion with a consideration of potential
explanations for some weaknesses in the empirical results, and how they may point
toward potentially fruitful extensions of the base model, and alternative approaches
toward data analysis. I conclude with a consideration of how the dynamic perspec-
tive of the present project fits in with, and differs from, existing work on legislator
behavior, party organization and democratic accountability in the U.S. House.
7.1 Theoretical Contributions
In Chapters 2 and 3, I motivated and developed a dynamic model of party dis-
cipline choice, legislator roll-call behavior and electoral feedback. In Chapter 4, I
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analyzed results from simulation experiments conducting using the model, with an
eye toward showing how the dynamic perspective on the connection between party
and legislator, and between legislator and constituent, could yield unique predictions
about the willingness cross-pressured legislators to support the party line on key roll-
call votes. There are two main theoretical contributions implicit in this approach.
The first is that it is valuable to model party decisions about discipline and legislator
choices about unity jointly, and as functions of the same external stimulus – the elec-
toral security enjoyed by party members. As was argued in Chapter 2, parties exist
to serve the interests of their members, and this necessitates modeling the choices of
party leaders and individual legislators, respectively, jointly and explicitly.
For the purposes of the present study, party leadership decisions and individual
legislator behavior were studied in the sequence implied by the model, focusing first
on generated levels of party disciplinary intensity, and then how party disciplinary
intensity interacted with legislators’ individual electoral considerations to produce
distributions of party loyalty rates. That is, the model framed the pathway from
electoral security to party loyalty rates as an interaction between choices of the two
different kinds of agents. Subsequent empirical tests followed in this spirit, jointly
estimating the dispersion of party unity rates at the caucus level with individual
legislator response to electoral pressure. It’s worth noting that, while the exploration
(and testing) of the model didn’t explicitly focus on differentiating the two pathways
by which electoral conditions could influence legislator behavior (e.g. party leaders
looking at the security of members, and members looking at their own individual
security), this is certainly possible to do within the model framework, and in a way
that could potentially generate diverging empirical expectations about member-driven
and leader-driven changes in observed party polarization.
The second theoretical contribution, which was of central importance to the
present study, was the addition of the dynamic perspective to the understanding of
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the connection between electoral security and party loyalty for cross-pressured mem-
bers. As discussed in Chapter 4, the finding of a curvilinear relationship between
the intensity of party disciplinary efforts and the impact of electoral insecurity upon
subsequent loyalty rates, highlighted the major contribution of the dynamic perspec-
tive – determining which patterns of electoral security and party loyalty were stable
over time, and which were not. When faced with an especially acute conflict between
party expectations and constituent desires, cross-pressured members were unable to
survive long enough to develop a moderate reputation.
Thus, in the context of the model, the question of moderate survival is inherently
dynamic, as it involves connecting behavior in one time period of the legislature to
the composition of the legislature in the next time period, and situates replacement
as an alternative channel of electoral accountability to adaptation, as suggested in
Theriault’s (2005) dichotomy. This finding also yielded additional testable implica-
tions about the relationship between legislator tenure and survival. This, in turn,
helped to organize the focus of empirical tests of model predictions, first relating to
the character of (ostensibly) stable model states (in Chapter 5), and then relating to
the character of potential changes via the channel of legislator defeat (in Chapter 6).
The dynamic perspective thus accommodated the development of a model in which
both stability and change could occur, and by delineating the conditions under which
each could occur, helped shape the subsequent generation of empirical tests of model
predictions relating to stability and change, respectively.
7.2 Summary & Implications of Empirical Findings
The predictions generated by the computational model can be usefully organized
into two sets of claims. The first set places the empirical estimation of individual
legislator responsiveness in the context of party caucuses, which feature a degree
of dispersion in loyalty rates that must be modeled simultaneously. The second set
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relates to the responsiveness and subsequent electoral survival of individual legislators,
as conditioned by the intensity of party-constituency cross-pressure, and legislator
tenure. The first set were investigated in Chapter 5, and the results were mixed.
More specifically, the hypothesized positive relationship between electoral security
and party loyalty for individual legislators found strong support among Northern
Democrats, but was unsupported for Southern Democrats, and only found sporadic
support among Republicans. Additionally, the hypothesized positive relationship
between intra-party preference heterogeneity and dispersion in party unity rates found
mixed support – the South dummy variable drove dispersion up for both parties, but
the measures of population density and Democratic presidential vote only had the
expected effect for Republican legislators.
The second set of predictions were investigated in Chapter 6, and again the results
were mixed. The hypotheses in that chapter dealt with how the intensity of cross-
pressure and legislative tenure could modify the relationship between electoral secu-
rity and party loyalty for individual legislators, and the degree to which party loyalty
influenced a legislators’ subsequent probability of successfully securing re-election.
For both the Democrats and Republicans, one of the cross-pressure indicators had
the expected modifying effect on legislator responsiveness to electoral security, with
Southern Democrats showing more responsiveness than Northern Democrats, and
Republicans from densely populated districts showing more responsiveness than Re-
publicans from less dense areas. Tenure also had the expected dampening effect on
legislative responsiveness for Democrats, but not for Republicans. Cross-pressure had
some conditioning effect on subsequent defeat probability for Republicans, with Re-
publicans representing more heavily Democratic areas being more likely to face defeat
for high rates of party loyalty than were Republicans from less heavily Democratic
areas, but not expected relationship held for Democrats. Tenure did not have the
expected dampening effect on the relationship between party loyalty and electoral
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survival for either party.
7.3 Issues & Extensions
While the mixed results do lend some support for the basic picture of party
decision-making, legislator adaptation and electoral response proposed in the dy-
namic model, they also suggest that the model could be improved in ways that would
further add to our understanding of the relationships between parties, legislators and
voters. In particular, the following issues could be profitably addressed in future work
within this research agenda – the role of party faction and the possibility of multidi-
mensional political conflict, the role of intra-party politics in nomination politics and
punishment behavior, further development of the agenda generation mechanism, and
breaking up the data analysis across time periods.
The role of faction and multidimensionality
As was suggested in Chapter 5, it’s worth considering the role that party fac-
tions may play in conditioning the behavior of individual legislators. In particular,
regional differences within parties often play a key role in determining when the
model’s hypotheses find substantive support. One could potentially attribute this to
the capacity for regional factions within the party to develop their own ideological
reputations, which may align imperfectly with the general policy orientation of their
national parties – this seems like to be the case with Southern Democrats throughout
the period in question, as well as with Northeastern Republicans in the mid-to-late
20th century. These alternative anchors of partisan identity disrupt the essential
mechanism of the accountability relationship posited by the model, which assumes
that legislators may only distance themselves from the party by moderating along the
single dimension of conflict produced by aggregating “party unity” votes. A multidi-
mensional version of the model may be able to accommodate the concept of multiple
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“poles” of identification for each party, to which individual legislators may anchor
themselves as fits their electoral needs. Additionally, accounting for regional differ-
ences in party organizations could allow for the possibility of recruiting candidates
from pools with different ideological distributions, depending on their constituency.
Intra-party politics
As currently configured, the model features a very simple mechanism by which
parties select challengers and open seat candidates for office – they are drawn at
random from a national recruitment pool with fixed ideological characteristics. Such
a perspective has the virtue of simplicity, but rules out the possibility of strategic
recruitment of candidates, such as parties selecting candidates with known, moder-
ate ideological characteristics in districts which differ ideologically from the party.
Further, primary challenges to sitting legislators, and contested primaries within the
party, are ruled out by assumption in the model.
What these restrictions share in common is the exclusion of any actors that may
make decisions so as to secure the “best representative possible” given district charac-
teristics – preventing strongly partisan candidates from running in moderate districts,
and insisting upon partisan purity from representatives from uncompetitive districts.1
This could be achieved via the addition of an additional actor – perhaps a party of-
ficial or “activist,” who is responsible for selecting candidates in a strategic manner,
or for assigning the degree of punishment for disloyal members, conditional upon
the ideological characteristics of their district. Including such an actor could help
account for the possibility of relatively loyal members being punished for not being
loyal enough, and could also account for the tolerance that may be shown to moderate
members for towing the party line on a less frequent basis.
1This issue mirrors one face by party leaders, in their inability to selectively apply discipline to
members, or strategically release moderates when their votes are not needed.
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Agenda-generation mechanisms
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the mechanism by which the voting agenda within
the dynamic model is generated is very simple – each party makes a series of proposals
to move status quo policy closer to preferences of the median district represented
by the party. This assumption removes the possibility of strategic action by party
leaders, by removing any leverage that leaders would have over presentation of the
party’s goals, as well as over tactical considerations regardless policy proposals (e.g.
offering the closest proposal to the party’s preferred policy that stands a chance of
being adopted). While this approach to the agenda-generation mechanism had the
virtue of greatly simplifying decisions by party leaders (who only had to look at the
electoral security of a subset of their members, and choose an intensity of discipline
based on those security inputs), it also ignores important factors that likely impact the
composition of the set of “party votes” in the House. These would include strategic
censoring of party-splitting votes to avoid majority rolls (Cox and McCubbins 2007),
the role of outside groups/factors in producing a “systemic agenda” of possible issues
to address (Binder 2003), and in the role of technology in facilitating the collection
of recorded votes on procedural issues (Roberts 2007).
At least in regard to the first two factors, it is possible to imagine additions to the
model that could add realism to its predictions. Party leaders could be made more
strategic, perhaps by allowing some simple input like net electoral security or majority
size to condition their determination of the ideological character of the party agenda.
Additionally, one could imagine the inclusion of agents outside the chamber (e.g., “
policy demanders”) who helped to endogenously determine the pool of distributive
resources available for party leaders to hold in bond. The third issue is more difficult
to broach theoretically, but could be addressed empirically by separately analyzing
different sorts of party votes (e.g. final passage votes vs procedural votes.)
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Breaking Up the Analysis
One last way in which the present project could be improved would be to divide
the data set in question into historical eras, permitting a more targeted analysis of
the dynamics of party loyalty and electoral accountability within particular historical
contexts, and facilitating potentially informative comparisons between historical eras.
The dynamic model developed for this project is necessarily generic and was tested
over the longest period for which party organization of the chamber (Jenkins and
Stewart 2013) and the “electoral connection” between individual legislators and their
constituencies (Carson and Jenkins 2011) could be said to exist – that is, since the
end of Reconstruction. This approach to testing has the advantage of breadth and
generality, but also risks pooling together disparate eras in a way that may mask
the relationships between electoral security and party loyalty that exist within each
era. Further, this broad approach eliminates the possibility of determining when the
model’s predictions are most strongly supported, which could help to highlight the
strengths and shortcomings of the core theoretical assumptions of the model.
While the present analysis does feature some capacity for historical discrimination,
through the inclusion of analyses with independent variables that weren’t available
for the entire period (i.e. Democratic presidential vote), and allows for the analysis
of changes in parameter values over time using structural change models, no sys-
tematic attempt was made to break up model data by time period. When the data
were divided by time period – among Republicans before and after the mid-1930s –
interesting differences between the eras emerged, reflecting the shifting preferential
center of gravity within the party. This finding suggests that further subdivision of
the data set into relevant historical eras may similarly shed some light on the shifting
relationships between party, legislators and constituencies over time.
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7.4 Relating the Dynamic Perspective to Existing Scholar-
ship
Having summarized the theoretical and empirical contributions of the project,
and having given consideration to potential additions and extensions to the model, it
would be worthwhile to line up the present (and potential future) trajectory of this
research agenda to existing work on legislator behavior and electoral accountability.
Generally, the approach and the results in the current project are complementary to
existing work, and suggest ways in which future work in the area could be improved.
More specifically, it’s worth considering the relevance of the work to existing studies of
legislator responsiveness to electoral pressures, to the role of within-party preference
agreement in partisan organization of the legislature, and to connection between party
loyalty behavior and democratic accountability.
Legislator Responsiveness to Electoral Conditions
As was noted in Chapter 2, existing work on the behavior of House members shows
that representatives are responsive to constituency influence, as expressed through the
channel of changes to electoral security. Most directly, Carson et al (2010) establish
that individuals do alter their rates of party support on roll-call votes in response
to diminished electoral security. Further, there exists substantial evidence that this
member responsiveness to electoral signals is most acute in competitive House districts
(Griffin 2006), and that members representing the most competitive districts are more
likely to distance themselves from party messaging efforts (Casas et al 2014). The
findings of this project are generally complementary to the picture that emerges
from these works, but suggests that the literature on legislator responsiveness could
be improved by paying more attention to the context in which legislators make their
decisions to respond or fail to respond to shifts in their electoral security. Specifically,
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attention should be paid to intra-party factors, like preference heterogeneity within
the party caucus, in conditioning the distribution of individual party unity rates.
Further, the findings in the present study suggest that it may be profitable to
look more closely at the role that a legislator’s tenure in the chamber plays in de-
termining both a legislator’s absolute level of partisan support, and the degree to
which legislators alter their level of party support with respect to changes in their
electoral security. For instance, Theriault (2006) attributes a substantial portion of
recent party polarization to adaptation by existing members (that is, they develop
more extreme voting records as their careers go on), but does not attempt to explain
the source of this change on the part of those members. Since incumbents generally
enjoy greater electoral security as they progress in their careers, it would be worth-
while to determine whether legislators become more partisan as they progress owing
to increased electoral security, or to some factor intrinsic to being longer-tenured
– for instance, the development of a known ideological reputation that appeals to
risk-averse voters.
Intra-party Preference Agreement and Conditional Party Government
The approach of the present project to modeling intra-party decision-making owes
a great deal to the conditional party government perspective on legislative organiza-
tion in the House (Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 2000). As discussed in Chapter
2, the conditional party government thesis attributes partisan polarization in House
roll-call voting records to party disciplinary regimes, which are in turn linked to intra-
party preference agreement, and to inter-party preference disagreement, in a given
Congress. The contribution of this perspective to the present project is most evident
in the conception of party discipline as a distinct influence on legislator behavior,
apart from a baseline predilection to party loyalty felt by an individual legislator.
While the model evaluated in this project does not directly link intra-party prefer-
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ence disagreement per se to disciplinary pressure, such links can grow (and vary in
strength) endogenously in the computational model.
Interestingly, recall that in the model, moderate defection behaviors occur most
strongly in the presence of party-constituency cross-pressure for moderate members
(which could be understood to preference disagreement) and moderate party dis-
ciplinary intensity. This indicates that the model endogenously generates at least
some separation between preference agreement and disciplinary intensity. This sep-
aration can likely be attributed to the nature of the decision function employed by
party leaders – leaders weight the electoral security of the party median and chamber
median in their decisions over disciplinary intensity, which may capture the role of
preference disagreement only imperfectly. Still, the joint modeling of leaders’ choice
with regards to the electoral conditions faced by key caucus members, along with
individual legislators’ choices with regard to their own electoral conditions, opens up
the possibility of being able to separate discipline-induced patterns in loyalty from
preferentially-induced patterns in loyalty, which has been a persistent criticism of the
conditional party government research program (Krehbiel 1998, 2003).
Democratic Accountability: The Connected Roles of Adaptation and Re-
placement
One of the major contributions of the dynamic perspective to the study of legis-
lator responsiveness to electoral pressure is the way in which it connects Theriault’s
(2005) “two faces of democratic accountability” – adaptation and replacement. More
specifically, a dynamic account of legislator adaptation (or inability to adapt) to elec-
toral pressure allows for the simultaneous generation of predictions regarding stable
model states (e.g. the degree of responsiveness exhibited by members who success-
fully seek re-election) and changes from one model state to another (as measured by
legislators who fail to successful adapt to electoral pressure, and are subsequently re-
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placed). The character of electoral feedback to excessively partisan behavior (Carson
et al 2010) and excessively ideological behavior (Canes-Wrone 2002, 2007) has been
investigated, demonstrating how electorates can make their displeasure with legislator
behavior known, including through the possibility of denying incumbents re-election.
As noted above, the capacity of legislators to adapt to electoral feedback has also
been established in the literature.
The key contribution of the dynamic perspective to future literature on demo-
cratic accountability lies in connecting adaptation and replacement, and in conceiving
of them as substitute pathways for responsiveness. More specifically, future studies of
legislator adaptation must take into account the possibility that insufficiently adap-
tive legislators will not be present in future observations in a data set. Conversely,
studies of electoral turnover and legislator replacement must consider the possibility
that electoral feedback allows re-election-minded legislators to avoid their electoral
reckoning by altering their behavior before the fact. Each of these caveats poses both
a theoretical and an empirical challenge for future studies of legislator behavior and
electoral response – challenges that suggest the continuing utility of modeling both
processes as two sides of the same democratic coin.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 The Model as Ergodic Markov Chain
Consider the following endogenous quantities calculated during each time step t
of model play:
• The vector Pt of Republican voting probabilities for each constituency i
• The vector Lt of party loyalty rates chosen by leach legislator j
• The agendas akt of each party k.
• The share of resources held in bond by each party, denoted bondkt
• The status quo policy, xSQ,t
Definition. The combination of endogenous variables denoted (Pt, Lt, akt, bondk,
xSQ,t) constitute a state space, denoted st for time t.
Then, consider the three major functions in model play mentioned above:
• Pt = f(x, µD, σD, µR, σD, nt, it)
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• bondkt = g(θ,α, pKM,t, pCM,t), for k ∈ [D,R],
• Lt = h(Pt, bondkt)
These formulas, in conjunction with the formula for determining party agendas,
and the vote outcomes which determine policy changes, completely describe the tran-
sition from one state of the model to another. Since f(·) is stochastic, and since
the re-election probabilities and election outcomes that flow from f(·) figure into the
calculation of g(·), h(·), and the other quantities, each one of the formulas is similarly
stochastic with respect to its status at the beginning of the time step.1
Observation. The stochastic processes applied to each element of s, jointly denoted
for convenience as m(·), have the Markov property. That is, st+1 = m(st). Thus,
the series of states defined by st+1 = m(st) are a Markov chain.
Since the properties of m do not change with time, the Markov chain can be called
time–homogeneous, implying that it has a stationary distribution, whose charac-
teristics depend only on the exogenous parameters of the model. More importantly,
the model is stochastic with respect to electoral feedback, and the errors can thus
propagate through leadership decision-making and legislator behavior, the model is
both positive recurrent and aperiodic. In other words, since the model is stochas-
tic, it can move from any point in the state space to any other point in the state
space (including returning to the prior point in the state space) in any time period
(including in a single step). This leads to the following observation:
Observation. As m(·) is aperiodic and positive recurrent, the Markov chain st+1 =
m(st) is ergodic.
1Note that they are not independently stochastic – that is, there is no independent source of
uncertainty driving, say, the choice of party discipline regime or the choice of legislator behavior. All
uncertainty present in these relationships is inherited from the electoral disturbances and retirements.
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This observation follows from the Markov ergodic theorem. For a Markov chain,
ergodicity means that the unique stationarity distribution to which the chain con-
verges will be equivalent to probability of being in the state space at any given time.
In other words, the behavior of the Markov chain over time will be the same as
the probability of behavior averaged over the state space of the system described
the chain. This means that time averages of system behavior, given “burn-in” (i.e.
achievement of the stationary distribution) will accurately characterize behavior of
the system, in general.
A.2 Notes on Construction of the Data Set
Legislators Included
Individual members were only included in the analysis if they met the following
conditions:
1. They were elected to Congress as the initial winner of a general election re-
counted in the CLEA data, and survived any applicable challenges.
2. They won said election running as a Democrat or Republican.
3. They cast more than 20 votes in the Congress to which they were elected.
Among those not included according to these criteria are:
1. Those elected to Congress on a third party ticket.
2. Those elected to Congress as a result of a special election to fill a vacancy caused
by a resignation, illness or death.
3. Those who switched parties during their term (the votes before the switch are
included.)
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4. Those who won initial election to Congress, but subsequently lost their seat due
to a successful contest of their election.
5. Those who won election to Congress after successfully contesting an election.
6. Those who failed to cast 20 votes in a particular Congress.
House District Shapefiles and Population Density Calculations
The sources for this data are GIS shapefiles for U.S. House districts, compiled
by Lewis et al (2013). Shapefiles were used to estimate the approximate size of each
congressional district, from the 46th Congress onward. States with single districts ap-
portioned to them (or using at-large seats for all of their districts) had their population
density calculated by taking their population at the most recent census, and divided
by the size of the state in square miles. In states with multiple districts, each congres-
sional district was assumed to have been assigned an equal proportion of the state’s
population, and this population was divided by the size of the district as determined
from the shapefile. In the case of a mixed allocation of geographically-apportioned
districts and statewide at-large districts (as was often the case in post-census elections
in the early-to-mid-20th century), the at-large districts’ densities were calculated in
the same manner as at-large districts for small states (e.g. dividing the entire popula-
tion by the entire square mileage of the state) and the apportioned districts’ densities
were calculated by dividing the population equally across the apportioned districts,
and dividing by district size.
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